Olivier Gossner

Prof. Dr. Olivier Gossner

CNRS — Ecole polytechnique, Palaiseau, France and London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2011 in Econometrica
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Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
We introduce entropy techniques to study the classical reputation model in which a long-run player faces a series of short-run players. The long-run player's actions are possibly imperfectly observed. We derive explicit lower and upper bounds on the equilibrium payoffs to the long-run player

1 September 2018 in Journal of Economic Theory
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Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
JSJakub Steiner
Jakub Steiner

30 November 2013 in Journal of Econometrics
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Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
KSKarl H. Schlag
Karl H. Schlag

3 October 2025 in Mathematics
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SZSaeed NAJAFI ZANGANEH
Saeed NAJAFI ZANGANEH
NGNaser Shams Gharneh
Naser Shams Gharneh
Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
Personnel selection represents a two-sided matching problem in which firms compete for qualified candidates by designing job-offer packages. While traditional models assume fully rational agents, real-world decision-makers often face bounded rationality due to limited information and cognitive constraints. This study develops a matching framework that incorporates bounded rationality through the Quantal Response Equilibrium, where firms and candidates act as probabilistic rather than perfect optimizers under uncertainty. Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation and organizational hiring data, we validate that both sides display bounded rational behavior and that rationality increases as the selection process advances. Building on these findings, we propose a two-stage stochastic optimization approach to determine optimal job-offer packages that balance organizational policies with candidate competencies. The optimization problem is solved using particle swarm optimization, which efficiently explores the solution space under uncertainty. Data analysis reveals that only 23.10% of low-level hiring decisions align with rational choice predictions, compared to 64.32% for high-level positions. In our case study, bounded rationality increases package costs by 26%, while modular compensation packages can reduce costs by up to 25%. These findings highlight the cost implications of bounded rationality, the advantages of flexible offers, and the systematic behavioral differences across job levels. The framework provides theoretical contributions to matching under bounded rationality and offers practical insights to help organizations refine their personnel selection strategies and attract suitable candidates more effectively.

16 March 2016 in International Journal of Game Theory
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Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
OHOri Haimanko
Ori Haimanko
ESEilon Solan
Eilon Solan

13 December 2024 in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
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MFMichael Florig
Michael Florig
Olivier GossnerOlivier Gossner
Olivier Gossner
We examine a general equilibrium investment model in which agents incur management costs for holding assets. We characterize the influence of these costs on equilibrium prices as a weighted average of these costs for market participants. We then propose a correction method for this influence in valuation procedures used under regulatory frameworks, such as Solvency II. For insurers subject to Solvency II, the accounting correction amounts to approximately €130 billion, the equivalent of 1.8% of investments or 14% of own funds. These results not only contribute to the understanding of management costs in market equilibrium, but also highlight a distortion in current practices which discourages the holding of assets that are expensive to manage and typically inaccessible directly by policyholders.