This paper explores qualifications to the much-discussed paradox that although aging is associated with multiple physical and social losses, subjective well-being (SWB) is stable or increasing in later life. We explore age-related changes in cognitive, affective, and eudaimonic dimensions in three waves of data spanning up to 15 years from the Norwegian NorLAG study (N = 4,944, age 40 − 95). We employ fixed-effect models to examine the nature and predictors of aging effects on SWB. Results indicate a general pattern of stability well into older age, but negative changes in advanced age across well-being measures. Declines in SWB are less pronounced and with a later onset for the cognitive compared with the other measures. Loss of health, a partner, and friends are robust predictors of declining SWB. Women report both more negative affect and engagement than men, and these differences increase with age. In conclusion, while increasing SWB from midlife to the mid-70 s attests to the adaptive behaviors and coping resources of young-old adults, the significant downturns in SWB in advanced age point to limits to psychological adjustment when health-related and social threats and constraints intensify.

Is public support for redistribution affected by the number of people experiencing economic strain in a country? This question is investigated by comparing twenty-eight countries in the fourth round of the European Social Survey 2008–09 using two-level linear regression models. The results show that individuals reporting economic strain support redistribution more strongly than those who do not experience economic strain. Further, individuals living in countries where many other people report economic strain also support redistribution more strongly than individuals living in countries with less economic strain. The latter correlation is not explained by objective measures of the economic situation such as household income or the income dispersal of the country. The country-level effect of economic strain holds for all income levels. It is largely driven by a tendency to strongly believe in redistribution when living in countries of widespread economic strain. The results indicate that governments would receive more rather than less public support for redistributive policies during periods of economic strain.

This study investigates how far the nuclear family—in terms of entering cohabitation and marriage and having a first and second child—affects religious salience, religious attendance, and activity in religious organizations. Previous research has shown that religious individuals are more likely to marry, and have higher fertility, than non-religious individuals. Less is known about how far the nuclear family also affects religiosity. This study presents longitudinal evidence on how religious factors change within the life-course of individuals after entering cohabitation or marriage and after having a first or second child in up to 14 waves of the British Household Panel Survey collected between 1991 and 2009. The comparison between longitudinal and cross-sectional results indicates how far religious factors affect family formation processes. All religious factors investigated (salience, attendance, activity) increased when people became parents, as well as when they married, but not when they started to cohabit. Most of these effects are long-lasting and they hold across age, gender and cohort groups.