Rasha M. Ahmed

Dr. Rasha M. Ahmed


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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RARasha M. Ahmed
Rasha M. Ahmed
SSSahar Al Seesi
Sahar Al Seesi
GSGerardo Ruiz Sánchez
Gerardo Ruiz Sánchez
Online markets offer sellers access to buyers’ information and, thus, the potential to alter prices and products accordingly. In light of this, we undertook an empirical analysis to test for individualization on Amazon.com. We collect data from individuals recruited to shop for household items. Our results indicate evidence of individualization of search results and net prices (via coupons). We found, contrary to what was expected, that demographic, geolocation, and account information play an insignificant role in individualization of search results. Thus, we conclude that individualization is based on more dynamic information, e.g., online browsing behavior. This highlights the fact that sellers’ need for (and use of) buyer information goes beyond the simple information accessible from the buyers’ accounts to a more rigorous monitoring of buyers’ online behavior.

RARasha M. Ahmed
Rasha M. Ahmed
This paper builds a theoretical framework to model individualization in online markets. In a market with consumers of varying levels of demand, a seller offers multiple product bundles and prices. Relative to brick-and-mortar stores, an online seller can use pricing algorithms that can observe a buyer’s online behavior and infer a buyer’s type. I build a generalized model of price discrimination with Bayesian learning where a seller offers different bundles of the product that are sized and priced contingent on the posterior probability that the consumer is of a given type. Bayesian learning allows the seller to individualize product menus over time as new information becomes available. I explain how this strategy differs from first- or second-degree price discrimination models and how Bayesian learning over time affects equilibrium values and welfare.

17 September 2012 in Strategic Behavior and the Environment
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RARasha M. Ahmed
Rasha M. Ahmed
While Voluntary Environmental Programs (VEPs) have been widely used as a tool to reduce environmental damages in several contexts, incentives to participate have been a serious concern. The literature on VEPs shows that firms have an incentive to participate if participation is associated with an improved image, preemption of future regulation or emissions tax reductions. Otherwise participation incentives are limited. In this paper I show that, in the context of product markets, VEPs can be designed to create participation incentives. A VEP to expand production of a green product can offer participants a competitive advantage as it allows firms to credibly commit to a given output level. I consider a market where firms produce a differentiated product: a green and a brown version of a given product. The VEP requires participants to meet a target level of production of the green model that exceeds the free market level. The results show that participation incentives can exist in the absence of a regulatory threat or tax benefits, and that a tradeoff exists between the stringency of the target and the equilibrium level of participation. Under a mild target full participation in the VEP is a Nash equilibrium. However, a larger target results in less than full participation or no participation at all. Finally, while the VEP always increases competition between firms and increases market surplus, it may result in a higher level of environmental damages. Thus, the welfare implications of VEPs of this type should be carefully analyzed before they can be implemented.

16 March 2012 in Environmental Economics and Policy Studies
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RARasha M. Ahmed
Rasha M. Ahmed