With the increasing popularity of new energy vehicles (NEVs), a large number of automotive batteries are intensively reaching their end-of-life, which brings enormous challenges to environmental protection and sustainable development. This paper establishes a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model composed of a power battery manufacturer and a NEV retailer. The benchmark scenario of CLSC members without blockchain technology is analyzed, and the optimal recycling strategy of the manufacturer and retailer using traceability information based on blockchain technology is discussed. We generate our findings from three aspects, as follows: the manufacturer or retailer is more willing to take the responsibility of recycling when the proportion of retired batteries that can be used in echelons is relatively high. Meanwhile, when the recycling cost is large, both manufacturers and retailers should adopt blockchain technology to obtain greater profits. Furthermore, with the improvement of traceability information transmission efficiency, a higher profit growth rate will be achieved.

This paper investigates channel selection and quality effort in O2O takeout service supply chain consisting of a takeout platform, a catering business, and a distribution rider. By analyzing the three operation modes of platform distribution, business self‐distribution, and business self‐built platform + distribution, the profit functions of O2O takeout service supply chain members are constructed, respectively. On the basis of game theory, the optimal quality effort and profits are obtained. Combined with numerical simulation, the effects of revenue sharing rate and market size on the optimal quality effort and profits under different scenarios are discussed. The results reveal that O2O takeout platform should cooperate with more catering businesses, and adopt appropriate strategies considering different market sizes of catering businesses. Additionally, the catering business should properly consider the market size and adopt different online and offline prices. Meanwhile, the rider should choose a reasonable quality effort according to the revenue sharing rate.

Purpose: The paper aims to investigate the optimal service quality and pricing for a mobile application (App) service supply chain (SSC) and analyze the impact of network externality on App SSC members' utilities. After that, the corresponding management inspirations and suggestions are put forward.Design/methodology/approach: The paper developed a SSC consisted of an App service supplier and an App service operator. Our models aim to maximize the SSC members' utilities. By utilizing the game theory, equilibrium solutions are obtained. Numerical examples are used to manifest the impact of parameters on decisions by Matlab. Some management enlightenment could be obtained by comparison analysis.Findings: Cooperating with an App service operator that asks for a lower revenue sharing ratio will enable the App service supplier to have sufficient funds to provide high-quality update service. With the increase of network externality, adopting a high-quality service strategy can bring higher utility to the App service operator and users. Pouring attention into consumer welfare moderately will improve the App service supplier's utility. Scenario CRS can achieve a win–win goal for App SSC members and consumers.Originality/value: The innovations of this paper are as follows: Firstly, the authors investigate the optimal service quality and pricing for the App SSC, which has been discussed little in previous literature. Secondly, the authors discuss how network externality and enterprises' attention to consumer welfare affect the optimal decisions and utilities of App service supply chain members. Thirdly, this paper considers four different circumstances and determines the optimal operation scenario for App SSC through comparative analysis.