Ilan Dar-Nimrod

Dr. Ilan Dar-Nimrod

School of Psychology, Faculty of Science, Rm No, 420 Brennan MacCallum Building, A18, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2011 in Psychological Bulletin
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Journal Article
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IDIlan Dar-Nimrod
Ilan Dar-Nimrod
SHSteven J. Heine
Steven J. Heine
This article introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as (a) immutable and determined, (b) having a specific etiology, (c) homogeneous and discrete, and (d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of "strong genetic explanation" when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate; however, people tend to overweigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of "weak genetic explanation," which are far more common. The authors reviewed research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness, and obesity through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientific and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism, which identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases, are discussed.

20 October 2006 in Science
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IDIlan Dar-Nimrod
Ilan Dar-Nimrod
SHSteven J. Heine
Steven J. Heine
Stereotype threat occurs when stereotyped groups perform worse as their group membership is highlighted. We investigated whether stereotype threat is affected by accounts for the origins of stereotypes. In two studies, women who read of genetic causes of sex differences performed worse on math tests than those who read of experiential causes.

1 August 2017 in Nature Human Behaviour
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WGWill M. Gervais
Will M. Gervais
DXDimitris Xygalatas
Dimitris Xygalatas
RMRyan T. McKay
Ryan T. McKay
MEMichiel van Elk
Michiel van Elk
EBEmma E. Buchtel
Emma E. Buchtel
JBJoseph Bulbulia
Joseph Bulbulia
Mounting evidence supports long-standing claims that religions can extend cooperative networks 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 . However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component 5 . Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a given religious group, promoting regional violence 10 , intergroup conflict 11 and tacit prejudice against non-believers 12 ,13 . Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in increasingly secular societies 14 —affects employment, elections, family life and broader social inclusion 12 ,13 . Preliminary work in the United States suggests that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N = 3,256; 13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and morality, people in most—but not all— of these countries viewed extreme moral violations as representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist participants around the world. The results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries 15 , and imply that the recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful influence on moral judgements persists, even among non-believers in secular societies.

18 July 2019 in British Journal of Clinical Psychology
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RMRachel E. Menzies
Rachel E. Menzies
LSLouise Sharpe
Louise Sharpe
IDIlan Dar-Nimrod
Ilan Dar-Nimrod

1 April 2009 in Personality and Individual Differences
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Journal Article
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IDIlan Dar-Nimrod
Ilan Dar-Nimrod
CRCatherine D. Rawn
Catherine D. Rawn
DLDarrin R. Lehman
Darrin R. Lehman
BSBarry Schwartz
Barry Schwartz