Confirmation bias is the tendency to acquire or evaluate new information in a way that is consistent with one's preexisting beliefs. It is omnipresent in psychology, economics, and even scientific practices. Prior theoretical research of this phenomenon has mainly focused on its economic implications possibly missing its potential connections with broader notions of cognitive science. We formulate a (non-Bayesian) model for revising subjective probabilistic opinion of a confirmationally-biased agent in the light of a persuasive opinion. The revision rule ensures that the agent does not react to persuasion that is either far from his current opinion or coincides with it. We demonstrate that the model accounts for the basic phenomenology of the social judgment theory, and allows to study various phenomena such as cognitive dissonance and boomerang effect. The model also displays the order of presentation effect–when consecutively exposed to two opinions, the preference is given to the last opinion (recency) or the first opinion (primacy) –and relates recency to confirmation bias. Finally, we study the model in the case of repeated persuasion and analyze its convergence properties. The standard Bayesian approach to probabilistic opinion revision is inadequate for describing the observed phenomenology of persuasion process. The simple non-Bayesian model proposed here does agree with this phenomenology and is capable of reproducing a spectrum of effects observed in psychology: primacy-recency phenomenon, boomerang effect and cognitive dissonance. We point out several limitations of the model that should motivate its future development.
Statistical mechanics is based on the interplay between energy and entropy. Here we formalize this interplay via axiomatic bargaining theory (a branch of cooperative game theory), where entropy and negative energy are represented by utilities of two different players. Game-theoretic axioms provide a solution to the thermalization problem, which is complementary to existing physical approaches. We predict thermalization of a nonequilibrium statistical system employing the axiom of affine covariance, related to the freedom of changing initial points and dimensions for entropy and energy, together with the contraction invariance of the entropy-energy diagram. Thermalization to negative temperatures is allowed for active initial states. Demanding a symmetry between players determines the final state to be the Nash solution (well known in game theory), whose derivation is improved as a by-product of our analysis. The approach helps to retrodict nonequilibrium predecessors of a given equilibrium state.
26 February 2014 in The European Physical Journal B
The notion of mean temperature is crucial for a number of fields, including climate science, fluid dynamics, and biophysics. However, so far its correct thermodynamic foundation is lacking or even believed to be impossible. A physically correct definition should not be based on mathematical notions of the means (e.g., the mean geometric or mean arithmetic), because they are not unique, and they ignore the fact that temperature is an ordinal level variable. We offer a thermodynamic definition of the mean temperature that is based upon the following two assumptions. First, the correct definition should necessarily involve equilibration processes in the initially nonequilibrium system. Among such processes, reversible equilibration and fully irreversible equilibration are the two extreme cases. Second, within the thermodynamic approach we assume that the mean temperature is determined mostly by energy and entropy. Together with the dimensional analysis, the two assumptions lead to a definition of the mean temperature that is determined up to a weight factor that can be fixed to due to the maximum ignorance principle. The mean temperature for ideal and (van der Waals) nonideal gases with temperature-independent heat capacity is given by a general and compact formula that (besides the initial temperatures) only depends on the heat capacities and concentration of gases. Our method works for any nonequilibrium initial state, not only two-temperature states.
We study a neuro-inspired model that mimics a discussion (or information dissemination) process in a network of agents. During their interaction, agents redistribute activity and network weights, resulting in emergence of leader(s). The model is able to reproduce the basic scenarios of leadership known in nature and society: laissez-faire (irregular activity, weak leadership, sizable inter-follower interaction, autonomous sub-leaders); participative or democratic (strong leadership, but with feedback from followers); and autocratic (no feedback, one-way influence). Several pertinent aspects of these scenarios are found as well—e.g., hidden leadership (a hidden clique of agents driving the official autocratic leader), and successive leadership (two leaders influence followers by turns). We study how these scenarios emerge from inter-agent dynamics and how they depend on behavior rules of agents—in particular, on their inertia against state changes.
The search of an unstructured database amounts to finding one element having a certain property out of elements. The classical search with an oracle checking one element at a time requires on average steps. The Grover algorithm for the quantum search and its unitary Hamiltonian evolution analog accomplish the search asymptotically optimally in time steps. We reformulate the search problem as a dissipative, incoherent Markov process acting on an -level system weakly coupled to a thermal bath. Assuming that the energy levels of the system represent the database elements, we show that, with a proper choice of the spectrum and long-range but bounded transition rates between the energy levels, the system relaxes to the ground state, corresponding to the sought element, in time .