Carbon emission abatement is very important for manufacturers regulated by environmental policies. However, choosing an optimal carbon abatement strategy is difficult for many firms. This paper attempts to explore the appropriate carbon abatement strategy for firms that are regulated by cap-and-trade. Specifically, by bringing remanufacturing into consideration, this paper examines a manufacturer that has four alternative carbon abatement strategies: (1) do nothing, (2) invest in carbon abatement, (3) engage in remanufacturing, or (4) become involved in investment and remanufacturing together. The models of these four strategies are first developed in a monopolistic operating environment. The results show that among the four carbon abatement strategies, although the fourth strategy has the highest costs, it generates the largest profits for the manufacturer, passes the greatest benefits along to consumers, and has the best environmental performance. Next, this study is extended to a competitive environment. The results show that the optimal strategy in the monopolistic environment no longer maximizes profits, and decision guidance is offered for the manufacturer operating under such an environment.

In the past decade, BRICS countries have become the main driver of global economic growth. China, as a major member of BRICS, has gradually opened up its own capital market and gained ever-growing interconnection with global capital markets, with the implement the QFII and QDII system. Therefore, it is of great significance to explore the stock markets linkage between China and other BRICS nations. In this paper, it focuses on the long-term equilibrium relations and short-term dynamic linkage among the BRICS stock markets, and uses such tools as co-integration test, causality test, impulse-response and variance decomposition, to analyze the correlation of representative stock indexes in BRICS countries. The empirical results show that, in the long term and the short term, there is a clear stock correlation among the BRICS markets. In the long run, there is a reliable co-integration relationship among all the stock markets. Moreover, Granger causality test results show that China’s stock market is influenced by other countries instead of influencing others, and most of the causal relationships are bidirectional. In the short run, the results of impulse-response and variance decomposition show that China’s market volatility has the largest and most obvious spillover effect on other countries’ stock markets. This paper will help the authorities of BRICS with the formulation of macroeconomic policies as well as the establishment of regulatory mechanisms, and the investors with rational investment strategy.

Global retail e-commerce sales have surged, yet product fit uncertainty remains a significant challenge, leading to rising product return rates. To address consumer concerns about return shipping costs, major Chinese online retail platforms have introduced return shipping insurance (RSI). Retailers can choose between Retailer-RSI (RRSI), which is provided by the retailer, and Customer-RSI (CRSI), which is purchased by consumers. Despite these options, information asymmetry causes insurers to assess return rates with bias—referred to as managerial confidence bias. Consequently, platforms are increasingly partnering with insurers to enhance their RSI offerings. This study develops a game-theoretical model to examine the dynamics between a platform and an insurer, as well as the impact of managerial confidence bias on RSI strategies. Our analysis reveals that the platform–insurer relationship is crucial in determining the optimal RSI strategy. Under an independent insurer, RSI is viable only if the insurer underestimates product return rates (i.e., exhibits overconfidence bias); RRSI is preferred if the bias is sufficiently strong, whereas CRSI is chosen otherwise. In contrast, under a dependent insurer, CRSI is favored by the retailer only when its return handling costs are substantially high; otherwise, RRSI is preferred. Furthermore, RSI consistently increases consumer surplus by reducing return hassle costs while only mildly raising the product price. However, the independent insurer’s bias leads to its own profit loss, resulting in a “loss–win–win–win” scenario across stakeholders. In contrast, the dependent insurer, supported by platform subsidies, can yield a “win–win–win–win” outcome that aligns stakeholder interests and enhances long-term platform benefits.