This paper constructs a difference-in-difference (DID) model and uses the survey data of the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) to examine the impact of agricultural subsidies on the income of rural households. The empirical results although capture a significant increase of the income of rural households after the expansion policy of the agricultural subsidies, this improvement of income only can be confirmed in the low income rural households. In addition, two possible mechanisms can provide interpretations for the influence of agricultural subsidies on the income of rural households: (ⅰ) the support by agricultural subsidies increases the transfer income of rural households (transfer effect); (ⅱ) agricultural subsidies encourage farmers to invest their surplus labour in non-agricultural markets to obtain wage income (productivity effect).

This article studies the relationship between environmental governance, public health expenditure, and economic growth by introducing human health status into a three-period overlapping generation dynamic general equilibrium (OLG-DGE) model and conducting a policy simulation analysis in a Chinese scenario. The main findings are generalized as follows: (i) The increase in pollution emissions per unit of output will not only lead to the deterioration of public health but also hinder long-term economic growth, while the efficiency of pollution control will improve health and output per labor unit; (ii) Although levying environmental tax will improve health status and life expectancy, it has a non-linear impact on pollution emissions and output per labor unit, which means that there are trade-offs among environmental governance, public health improvement, and economic output; and (iii) Although the increase in the proportion of public health expenditure will improve health status, its impact on life expectancy and economic output is affected by the level of environmental tax. Only when the environmental tax rate is relatively low, will increasing the proportion of public health expenditure extend life expectancy and output per labor unit.

The study creates a simplified game model to propose a suitable policy to foster a win-win scenario between care institutions and families of the disabled elderly, and to give a reference basis for enhancing the welfare level of the disabled elderly as well as the commercial performance of care institutions. First, we study and synthesise the experiences of contemporary Chinese long-term care pilot cities to offer data for subsequent numerical analysis; second, we create an evolutionary game model to depict the conflicts and evolving patterns of conflicts between the disabled elderly and care facilities in China; and third, we use numerical analysis to investigate the effects of internal factors (cost of care, price of care) and policy assistance (government subsidies). Finally, we utilise numerical analysis to investigate how internal factors (cost of care, price of care) and policy assistance (government subsidy) affect the combination of solutions. The study reveals that (1) the two-sided strategic choices of care institutions and disabled families make the game unstable. (2) The government can influence the choice of care institutions and disabled families by tax rates and subsidies, implying a stability policy. (3) The presence of an evolutionary stabilization strategy implies that government control may have a desirable limit. When government engagement in this market is limited, “professional care, home care” finally becomes the evolutionary stability method.

I. The applications of big data for enterprises and societal development have become a focal point for entrepreneurs and policymakers. The narrow definition of big data applications solely refers t...