Dimitrios Giampouranis

Mr. Dimitrios Giampouranis

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 June 2022 in Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VLVasileios Liatsos
Vasileios Liatsos
DGDimitrios Giampouranis
Dimitrios Giampouranis
MICHAIL GKOLIASMICHAIL GKOLIAS
MICHAIL GKOLIAS
SMSabyasachee Mishra
Sabyasachee Mishra
JHJohn Hourdos
John Hourdos
CNClayton Nicholas
Clayton Nicholas
Truck platooning and related autonomous vehicle coordination concepts have been proposed as sustainable ways to increase profits and improve service quality. Recently the concept of truck caravanning, a hybrid truck platooning with only one truck driver required per platoon, has been proposed in the literature. This paper describes the research effort in developing a model that can estimate the cost savings of truck caravanning. The motivation of the proposed model is to investigate if substantial monetary savings exist to justify the initial capital investment (both in equipment and infrastructure) required for the implementation of the truck caravanning concept. A linear programming model is developed and used to evaluate different size networks. Results from numerical experiments indicate that a caravan size of four trucks or greater is needed for significant cost savings to be achieved and that driver compensation is the most critical factor dictating profitability.

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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DGDimitrios Giampouranis
Dimitrios Giampouranis
MICHAIL GKOLIASMICHAIL GKOLIAS
MICHAIL GKOLIAS
STSotirios Theofanis
Sotirios Theofanis
Maria BoileMaria Boile
Maria Boile
In this paper, we compare a multi-round, second-price, sealed-bid bundle auction and a single-item, sequential, second-price, sealed-bid auction for berth slot leasing for vessels (roll-on/roll-off passenger vessels and/or cruise ships) at a public marine terminal. The bundle auction mechanism is designed to maximize port operator profits by auctioning berth (time) slots in groups. The framework is tested using simulation by varying: the number of roll-on/roll-off passenger/cruise ship operating companies; the number of slots they bid for; and the mechanism design with regards to the winner determination, slot valuation, and max to min slot bid ratio among the bidders. The results indicate that neither auction type is a clear winner, and depending on the assumptions, a terminal operator should choose one over the other. The results from this study can be used by terminal operators, given their knowledge and/or assumptions on slot valuations and demand, to select a winner-determination policy and the minimum number of slots they allow players to bid for when designing the auction of their berth capacity to maximize their profits.