In recent years, Portugal has witnessed a large increase in municipal corporations to deliver public services. This article addresses the important question of why Portuguese municipalities choose municipal corporations to deliver certain services, while other services remain provided by in-house bureaucracies. We argue that political transaction costs in local service delivery, linked both to the characteristics of goods and services and to the political and financial features of the municipality, prevent or facilitate delivery by municipal corporations. Using data from 278 Portuguese local governments, multivariate probit models are employed to test hypotheses derived from this political transaction costs framework. Results support the idea that services involving the collection of user fees are more likely to be transferred to municipal corporations. The political and socio-economic context has to be considered in this decision-making process. Local officials ignoring this information are likely to create service delivery mechanisms that are economically inefficient and/or politically unresponsive.
This article seeks to identify which factors lead local governments to use corporate public sector organizations, particularly municipal corporations, for service delivery. The authors argue that local officials trade off bureaucratic costs of in-house production with agency costs of external delegation to municipal corporations when deciding how to deliver local public services. Econometric models are employed to test this explanation for the adoption of municipal corporations by 278 Portuguese local governments. The results indicate that organizational size, financial independency and fiscal surplus, as well as ideological concerns and the activity of local interest groups, drive choices of local governance structures.
1 March 2007 in Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration
Talking is cheap, at least in the short term; elected officials may profess their preferences for IMC and yet deny IMA organisations the necessary resources to fulfil their missions. Driven by a focus on revealed preferences for inter-municipal cooperation, the article aims to answer two questions: Why do some IMA exhibit a high level of commitment on the part of their local government members whereas others remain underutilised, reflecting a choice by local governments to retain these responsibilities themselves? How does this commitment to IMAs vary over time? We use data from 25 IMAs over a 10-year period (2008–2018) in Portugal to assess the intensity of cooperation among Portuguese local governments through stand-alone organisations. The panel analysis regression supports the hypotheses that a larger number of local governments involved in IMAs and higher levels of heterogeneity among them make cooperation more difficult. In contrast, longer interaction in IMAs reinforces the intensity of cooperation.
This paper asks whether citizens judge public administration to be trustworthy using different criteria from other political institutions. Using survey data, we estimate ordered logistic and multivariate regressions to compare the determinants of trust in six different political-administrative institutions. Findings show that social trust, political interest, as well as other individual characteristics, have very similar effects on trust regardless of the institution. The evidence shows that people who are older and more educated, interested in politics, and employed in the public sector, are only slightly more likely to make some sort of distinction. Implications for non-discriminant judgement mechanisms are discussed.