Weight aggregation is the key process to solve a multiple-attribute group decision-making (MAGDM) problem. This paper is trying to propose a possible approach to objectivize subjective information and to aggregate information from attribute values themselves and decision-makers’ judgment. An MAGDM problem without information about decision-makers’ and attributes’ weight is considered. In order to define decision-makers’ subjective preference, their utility function is introduced. The attributes value matrix is converted into a subjective attributes value matrix based on their subjective judgment on attribute values. By utilizing the entropy weighting technique, decision-maker’s subjective weight on attributes and objective weight on attributes are determined individually based on the subjective attributes value matrix and attributes value matrix. Based on the principle of minimum cross-entropy, all decision-makers’ subjective weights are integrated into a single weight vector that is closest to all decision-makers’ judgment without any extra information added. Then, by applying the principle of minimum cross-entropy again, a weight aggregation method is proposed to combine the subjective and objective weight of attributes. Finally, an MAGDM example of project choosing is presented to illustrate the procedure of the proposed method.

Because of the risks existing in supply chain finance, taking accounts receivable factoring business as the research object, this paper uses the evolutionary game method to analyzes the factors affecting the decision-making of the participants in supply chain finance, constructs an evolutionary game model between small and medium-sized enterprises and financial institutions, and analyzes the mechanism of blockchain to solve the financial risks of the supply chain by comparing the changes of evolutionary stability strategies before and after the introduction of blockchain technology. This paper aims to reduce financing risks by analyzing the mechanism of blockchain technology in supply chain finance. It is found that, firstly, blockchain technology can reduce the credit risk of financial institutions and solve financing problem. Credit risk plays a decisive role in whether financial institutions accept financing business decisions. Blockchain technology can reduce the operational risk of financial institutions and improve the business income of financial institutions. Secondly, the strict regulatory environment formed by blockchain technology makes the default behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises and core enterprises in a high-risk state at all times. No matter the profit distribution proportion that small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain through collusion, they will not choose to default, which effectively solves the paradox that small and medium-sized enterprises cannot obtain loans from financial institutions despite the increased probability of compliance. Then, the evolutionary game between financial institutions and small and medium-sized enterprises is balanced in that financial institutions accept business applications, small and medium-sized enterprises abide by the contract, and the convergence effect is better. Therefore, blockchain technology not only reduces the financing risk of financial institutions but also helps to solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises.

As an important way to reduce emission, forestry carbon sink (FCS) has not been implemented effectively. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the effectiveness and mechanism of applying blockchain technology in FCS projects by utilizing the differential game model. A Stackelberg differential game model between forest farmers and emission-controlled enterprises (ECEs) is developed to analyze the optimal emission reduction efforts and the optimal trajectory of forest farmers and ECEs before and after introducing blockchain technology. It is found that: (1) At the initial stage of the utilization of blockchain technology, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stabilizing carbon prices, the ECEs prefer to purchase FCS instead of reducing emissions by their own technology. On the contrary, if blockchain technology takes a leading role in stimulating the vitality of the carbon trading market, ECEs tend to use emission abatement technology to meet the carbon quote requirements. (2) In the later stage, the incentive and stabilizing effects of blockchain technology on carbon prices tend to be balanced, and the emission reduction efforts of ECEs are lower than the efforts before applying blockchain technology. (3) The application of blockchain technology increases forest farmers’ willingness to reduce emissions because of its effection of cost reduction and efficiency improvement. Meanwhile, blockchain technology reduces abatement costs by influencing carbon prices. Therefore, blockchain technology improves forest farmers’ emission reduction efforts on the whole.

Consumer environmental awareness (CEA) can affect green consumption decisions in different and confusing ways. In order to explain the reasons for these divergences, this study divides CEA into two main components: the subjective effect and the social effect. Then, we integrate the two effects into the classic Hotelling model to study the influence of CEA’s subjective effect and social effect on price competition and product differentiation strategy. It was found that the subjective and social effects of CEA have opposite impacts on price competition and product differentiation strategies. The subjective effect of CEA increases the price and profit level of enterprises, and enlarges the difference in the environmental friendliness of products. Meanwhile, the social effect of CEA reduces the enterprises’ price and profit level, and narrows the difference in the environmental quality of products. Therefore, we suggest that it is necessary for producers of green products to distinguish between these two effects. Numerical examples are provided to verify our findings. Finally, some possible suggestions regarding the competition of green products are put forward which take into consideration the subjective and social effects of CEA. The main contribution of this paper is to theoretically explain the opposite effects of the two different components of CEA on environmentally friendly product pricing and differentiation strategy; this presents a possible explanation as to why the behavior regarding CEA differs, and provides theoretical support for enterprises to price and differentiate green products.