Robotic systems have been widely used in various industries, so the security of communication between robots and their components has become an issue that needs to be focused on. As a framework for developing robotic systems, the security of ROS2 (Robot Operating System 2) can directly affect the security of the upper-level robotic systems. Therefore, it is a worthwhile research topic to detect and analyze the security of ROS2. In this study, we adopted a formal approach to analyze the security of the communication mechanism of ROS2. First, we used a state transition system to model the potential vulnerabilities of ROS2 based on the ROS2 communication mechanism and the basic process of penetration testing. Secondly, we introduced a CIA model based on the established vulnerability model and used linear temporal logic to define its security properties. Then, we designed and implemented a vulnerability detection tool for ROS2 applications based on the vulnerability model and security properties. Finally, we experimentally tested some ROS2-based applications, and the results show that ROS2 has vulnerabilities without additional protection safeguards.

Smart contracts are the key software components to realize blockchain applications, from single encrypted digital currency to various fields. Due to the immutable nature of blockchain, any bugs or errors will become permanent once published and could lead to huge economic losses. Recently, a great number of security problems have been exposed in smart contracts. It is important to verify the correctness of smart contracts before they are deployed on the blockchain. This paper aims to verify the correctness of smart contracts in Ethereum transactions, and the model checker Spin is adopted for the formal verification of smart contracts in order to ensure their execution with respect to parties’ willingness, as well as their reliable interaction with clients. In this direction, we propose a formal method to construct the models for smart contracts. Then, the method is applied to a study case in the Ethereum commodity market. Finally, a case model is implemented in Spin, which can simulate the process’s execution and verify the properties that are abstracted from the requirements. Compared with existing techniques, formal analysis can verify whether smart contracts comply with the specifications for given behaviors and strengthen the credibility of smart contracts in the transaction.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an increasingly common paradigm. As IoT usage scenarios have increased, many challenges in IoT operating systems' safety and adaptability have remained. According to the programming model, IoT operating systems can be categorized into three types: multithreading, event-driven, and hybrid. Different operating system models are applied in different scenarios depending on the real-time requirements or resource richness. The safety of IoT operating systems is critical; hence, formal verification is an important method of detecting potential vulnerabilities and providing safety guarantees. This paper proposes a hybrid model for an IoT operating system and employs the Event-B method for modeling and verification. We rewrite the requirements and divide the Event-Bus hybrid operating system model into eight levels for refinement. The safety and liveness properties of Event-Bus are guaranteed by generating and proving the proof obligations at each model level. A large proportion of the proof obligations (91%) are automatically proven on the Rodin platform to simplify the development process.

In automobile industry, it is a common approach to develop automobile real-time operating systems under some standards. For instance, OSEK/VDX is a world-wide adopted open standard. Traditional workflow is to first understand the standard, design and develop a system, then test its conformance to the standard, and finally deploy. There are several issues with the traditional workflow, e.g., ambiguities in standards may lead to incorrect design and implementation of real-world systems; the conformance of real-world systems to standards is difficult to check; and bug fixing after implementation is costly. To remedy the situation, in this paper, we present a unified executable formal automobile kernel under OSEK/VDX standard by defining the operational semantics of the system services in the standard using a rewrite-based executable semantic framework called $\mathbb {K}$ . The formal kernel is unified in that it serves multiple purposes such as: 1) formal modeling of the OSEK/VDX standard helps detect ambiguities in the standard; 2) the executable kernel is essentially a formal model of the standard, which can be used to verify the correctness of automobile applications; and 3) verified applications can be used as test cases to check the conformance of a real-world automobile operating system against the OSEK/VDX standard. Using the formal kernel, we identify several ambiguities in the OSEK/VDX standard and a potential deadlock vulnerability in an industrial automobile application.