In recent years, Green BIM (building information modeling) is paid much attention and gets widespread concern in construction field, the majority of the projects using green building BIM technology also gained good results to effectively balance between sustainability and economic. This study is based on the innovation practice using BIM technology do energy simulation design in The Helsinki Music Center project. This project Build Green Building Environment through the followings: three-dimensional building information model, Energy Simulation at the Schematic Design Stage, Energy Simulation for Comparison of Design Alternatives, Lifecycle Assessment Analysis. This paper will give you a detail analysis.

The rapid rise of premium memberships on e-commerce platforms has made it a core strategy for platform competition, attracting widespread attention from the industry and academia. This paper studies two kinds of differentiated membership mechanisms, i.e. the General Pattern (GP) available to all consumers and the Top-tier Pattern (TP) offered only to high-value consumers. We have a detailed description of the consumer's consumption behaviour in line with the real platform competition scenario. We first conducted a separate analysis of the two membership mechanisms and found that the actual implementation effect of TP and GP membership mechanisms are equivalent when there is no membership competition. Then we focussed on the scenario of differentiated member competition. We discuss the interaction between the two membership mechanisms and do a sensitivity analysis of the optimal decisions. The impact of the membership mechanism competition on the member group segmentation and consumption transfer is depicted well and analysed. At last, we use numerical examples to show the relationship between platform profits and some important exogenous variables under differentiated membership competition, and we also find that the differentiated membership mechanisms competition can let the two platforms achieve a win-win result.

In this study, we investigated a closed-loop supply chain system comprising manufacturers and retailers engaged in recycling competition. The manufacturer is the CLSC Stackelberg leader. By developing a Stackelberg model incorporating marketing, we analyzed the impact of marketing efforts by different agents on the entire system, specifically focusing on marketing conducted by the manufacturer, the retailer, and the centralized supply chain. Our findings reveal that the manufacturer consistently prefers the retailer to undertake marketing efforts. In contrast, the retailer favors the manufacturer to handle marketing when recycling competition intensity is low but prefers to conduct marketing themselves when the competition intensity is high. The extent of environmental harm under different models depends on the base demand: no marketing results in the least harm when the base demand is low, marketing by manufacturers minimizes harm when the base demand is moderate, and marketing by retailers causes the least harm when the base demand is high. Then, we performed a numerical analysis of the marketing cost-sharing contract and found that an appropriate sharing ratio consistently enhances the profitability of the entire supply chain. Finally, we examined the impact of a government subsidy for remanufacturing on supply chain performance and found that when recycling competition intensity is moderate, a government subsidy enhances supply chain performance more effectively.

We investigate a closed-loop supply chain system comprising manufacturers and retailers engaged in recycling competition. The manufacture is the CLSC Stackelberg Leader. By developing a Stackelberg model incorporating marketing, we analyze the impact of marketing efforts by different agents on the entire system, specifically focusing on marketing conducted by the manufacturer, the retailer, and the centralized supply chain. Our findings reveal that the manufacturer consistently prefers the retailer to undertake marketing effort. In contrast, the retailer favors the manufacturer handling marketing when recycling competition intensity is low but prefer to conduct marketing himself when the competition intensity is high. The extent of environmental harm under different models depends on base demand: no marketing results in the least harm when base demand is low, marketing by manufacturers minimizes harm when base demand is moderate, and marketing by retailers causes the least harm when base demand is high. Finally, we perform a numerical analysis of the marketing cost-sharing contract and find that an appropriate sharing ratio consistently enhances the profitability of the entire supply chain.