The increasing trend towards the global use of Information Technology (IT) is currently determining the need for more and better infrastructures (both physical and digital) for processing, storing and transferring large amounts of data. As Critical Infrastructure (CI) that is potentially exposed and vulnerable to the impact of different types of phenomena (natural, technological, na-tech, etc.), data centers have to guarantee higher levels of security (physical, logical and operational), reliability and efficiency in the provision of services. Starting from a discussion of the main evidence related to this topic, considering both the most recent cases of failure and serious damage to data centers and the evolution of international and European regulation and standards, the authors propose an analytical methodology to assess the territorial risk factors for data centers by a multirisk, multi-dimensional and systemic approach. This proposal leads not only to a more explicit definition of exposure and vulnerable components, but also to the recognition of resources that—in the case of accidental events involving (directly or indirectly) data center infrastructures—may be implemented at different territorial levels as “protection” factors to ensure business continuity by considering the entire resilience cycle, from the prevention phase to the response and recovery phases.

In response to worsening environmental challenges, ensuring the continuity of energy services during extreme weather events has become increasingly urgent. A proactive and coordinated approach is therefore required, encouraging cooperation among stakeholders to share knowledge, provide training, and adopt common strategies. Such an approach is intended to mitigate both direct and indirect impacts of power outages on territorial systems, while enhancing their ability to manage and promptly recover from disruptions, thereby reinforcing the protection and resilience of the energy sector infrastructures. Based on the experience gained with the Lombardia Region (Northern Italy), operational recommendations are proposed to strengthen territorial resilience and reduce power network vulnerabilities to weather-related power outages. These recommendations are elaborated in accordance with the current European and national regulatory frameworks on the topic and account for emerging exposure and vulnerability factors in Lombardia by explicitly addressing differences between mountain and plain areas. They provide local authorities with coordinated planning tools to manage blackout risks across all disaster phases, supporting risk prevention and preparedness, facilitating emergency management, and enabling the rapid restoration of normal conditions in territories potentially exposed and vulnerable to electrical blackouts.

Italy was the first western country reached by the spread of SARS-CoV-2. It clustered in the first wave in the Lombardy region and in its surrounding areas. In this chapter, the authors delineate first the timeline and the rapid, highly dynamic evolution of the pandemic crisis in the country, focusing in particular on the Lombardy region, which was by far the hardest hit region with a very high number of hospitalizations, infected persons, and deaths. The chapter is organized in four sections. The first provides basic information needed to understand the pandemic governance in Italy, and the second illustrates the timeline of the emergency management in the first wave, until June. The third addresses criticalities and positive aspects of the response, and the fourth discusses two main aspects, namely the use of data and the interface between science and policy.