We present a model of changing the intensity of interaction based on the individual behavior to study the iterated prisoner's dilemma game in social networks. In this model, each individual has an assessed score of reputation which is obtained by considering the evaluation level of interactive partners for its present behavior. We focus on the effect of evaluation level on the changing intensity of interaction between individuals. For an individual with good behavior, the higher the evaluation level of its partners for its good behavior, the better its reputation, and the higher the probability of surrounding partners interaction with it. On the contrary, for an individual with bad behavior, the lower the evaluation level of its partners for its bad behavior, the worse its reputation, and the less the probability of surrounding neighbors interaction with it. Simulation results show that this effective mechanism can drastically facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in the population under a treacherous chip. Interestingly, for a small or moderate treacherous chip, the cooperation level monotonously ascends as the evaluation level increases; however, for a higher treacherous chip, existing an optimal evaluation level, which can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we find better agreement between simulation results and theoretical predictions obtained from an extended pair-approximation method, although there are some tiny deviations. We also show some typical snapshots of the system and investigate the reason for appearance and persistence of cooperation. The results further show the importance of evaluation level of individual behavior in coevolutionary relationships.
The occurrence and maintenance of cooperative behaviors in public goods systems have attracted great research attention across multiple disciplines. A threshold public goods game requires a minimum amount of contributions to be collected from a group of individuals for provision to occur. Here we extend the common binary-strategy combination of cooperation and defection by adding a third strategy, called insured cooperation, which corresponds to buying an insurance covering the potential loss resulted from the unsuccessful public goods game. Particularly, only the contributing agents can opt to be insured, which is an effort decreasing the amount of the potential loss occurring. Theoretical computations suggest that when agents face the potential aggregate risk in threshold public goods games, more contributions occur with increasing compensation from insurance. Moreover, permitting the adoption of insurance significantly enhances individual contributions and facilitates provision, especially when the required threshold is high. This work also relates the strategy competition outcomes to different allocation rules once the resulted contributions exceed the threshold point in populations nested within a dilemma.
We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly cooperative states even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a simple model of social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to a swarm of bees searching for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each player keeps track of the highest payoff attained within a local topological neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their own memory that keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a whole, to find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following extensive simulations of this setup, we find a significant increase in the level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution of the prisoner's dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the optimization algorithm when dealing with environments that strongly favor the proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an important phenomenon by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative way of understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence in nature, and we hope that this study will be inspirational for future efforts aimed in this direction.
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the “making of new friends” may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.