Does the cross-border strategic behavior of large firms reflect national differences? There is uncertainty about the ways in which expanding markets will influence the activities of large firms and national governments. Some theorists expect market forces to produce increasing pressure for uniform patterns of behavior, while others have argued that the national political economy is more resilient, and that corporate strategies remain identifiably national. Thus far the question, theoretically and empirically, has been posed in terms of economic behavior and consequences. We analyze the persistence of national practices in the political activities of large corporations using data on the Fortune 1000 industrial and service companies for 1988. To increase the sample of affiliates of foreign firms, we include firms in the Forbes ranking of largest U.S. affiliates of foreign firms. This source includes financial and service corporations as well as those in manufacturing industries. Overall, the findings suggest that, contrary to the national capitalism argument, firms adapt to the host political economy.

Group theorists led by Olson have observed that common interests do not produce collective action, except under conditions that overcome the free-rider incentive. While collective action theories have captured the imagination of the discipline, there has been surprisingly little examination of the relationship between business collective action and patterns of market structures. Research has instead focused more on firm-level political activity. Accordingly, this research addresses the original theoretical propositions by examining industry associations' political activity nationally. Some forty years after the formulation of the theoretical argument, we find evidence supporting the logic of collective action. More concentrated industries are likelier to have politically active associations than more competitive industries.

In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused widespread destruction and displacement in parts of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. This research evaluates determinants of displacement and, conditional on being displaced, the duration of displacement for households living in areas affected by these hurricanes. Hurdle Models, which assume that different processes govern zero outcomes (i.e., no displacement) and positive outcomes (i.e., amount of time displaced), are used to model the likelihood of household displacement and its duration as a function of socioeconomic characteristics, hurricane-caused property and neighborhood damage, social support, and financial assistance. Results show that mobile home residence, marital status, educational attainment, the presence of children, and property and neighborhood damage affect the likelihood and expected length of displacement among sample respondents. Financial assistance and social support are also correlated with displacement and its duration, but endogeneity concerns complicate the interpretation of these results. The findings highlight the diversity of factors that slow households’ return following displacement and underscore the need for additional research on the role of social capital in determining hazard-related outcomes.

Since Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action (1965), it is impossible for political scientists to conceive of political participation without reference to his powerful argument linking numbers of participants, public goods, and participatory outcomes. What is puzzling is the poor empirical support for this argument in the domain where it should work best, namely explaining business political activity. Olson thought his arguments principally applicable to economic groups, and for the empirical development of his arguments Olson drew heavily on business interests, the most active segment of the interest group community. We explore these arguments with business political activities data by examining the statistical performance of various measures of market structure in determining business political activity, and find little empirical support. We do offer an alternative basis for business behavior lodged in both private and collective goods that preserves business rationality and also helps explain not only the amount of business political participation but the modes of business participation.