Eric  Schniter

Dr. Eric Schniter

Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA, 92866, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2015 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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BCBrice Corgnet
Brice Corgnet
RGRoberto Hernan Gonzalez
Roberto Hernan Gonzalez
ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
On-the-job leisure is a pervasive feature of the modern workplace. We studied its impact on work performance in a laboratory experiment by either allowing or restricting Internet access. We used a 2 × 2 experimental design in which subjects completing real-effort work tasks could earn cash according to either individual- or team-production incentive schemes. Under team pay, production levels were significantly lower when Internet browsing was available than when it was not. Under individual pay, however, no differences in production levels were observed between the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in which it was not. In line with standard incentive theory, individual pay outperformed team pay across all periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was available. This was not the case, however, when Internet browsing was unavailable. These results demonstrate that the integration of on-the-job leisure activities into an experimental labor design is crucial for uncovering incentive effects.

29 April 2015 in American Journal of Physical Anthropology
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Journal Article
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ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
MGMichael Gurven
Michael Gurven
HKHillard S. Kaplan
Hillard S. Kaplan
NWNathaniel T. Wilcox
Nathaniel T. Wilcox
PHPaul L. Hooper
Paul L. Hooper

29 October 2017 in Evolution and Human Behavior
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Journal Article
Closed access
ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
NWNathaniel T. Wilcox
Nathaniel T. Wilcox
BBBret A. Beheim
Bret A. Beheim
HKHillard S. Kaplan
Hillard S. Kaplan
MGMichael Gurven
Michael Gurven

20 November 2014 in Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
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Journal Article
Open access
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ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta
Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of trust games with one-way communication and emotion surveys to investigate the role of emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended.

11 September 2020 in Human Nature
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Journal Article
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ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
TSTimothy W. Shields
Timothy W. Shields

1 March 2021 in Human Nature
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Journal Article
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PDF file
ESEric Schniter
Eric Schniter
SMShane J. Macfarlan
Shane J. Macfarlan
JGJuan J. Garcia
Juan J. Garcia
GRGorgonio Ruiz-Campos
Gorgonio Ruiz-Campos
DBDiego Guevara Beltran
Diego Guevara Beltran
JLJory C. Lerback
Jory C. Lerback