When we try to remember whether we left a window open or closed, do we actually see the window in our mind? If we do, does this mental image play a role in how we think? For almost a century, scientists have debated whether mental images play a functional role in cognition. The Case for Mental Imagery presents a complete and unified argument that mental images do depict information, and that these depictions do play a functional role in human cognition. It outlines a specific theory of how depictive representations are used in information processing, and shows how these representations arise from neural processes. To support this theory, it weaves together conceptual analyses and the many varied empirical findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In doing so, the book presents the conceptual grounds for positing this type of internal representation, summarizing and refuting arguments to the contrary. Its argument also serves as a historical review of the imagery debate from its earliest inception to its most recent phases, and provides evidence that significant progress has been made in our understanding of mental imagery. In illustrating how scientists think about one of the most difficult problems in psychology and neuroscience, this book goes beyond the debate, to explore the nature of cognition and to draw out implications for the study of consciousness.

Visual imagery is used in a wide range of mental activities, ranging from memory to reasoning, and also plays a role in perception proper. The contribution of early visual cortex, specifically Area 17, to visual mental imagery was examined by the use of two convergent techniques. In one, subjects closed their eyes during positron emission tomography (PET) while they visualized and compared properties (for example, relative length) of sets of stripes. The results showed that when people perform this task, Area 17 is activated. In the other, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) was applied to medial occipital cortex before presentation of the same task. Performance was impaired after rTMS compared with a sham control condition; similar results were obtained when the subjects performed the task by actually looking at the stimuli. In sum, the PET results showed that when patterns of stripes are visualized, Area 17 is activated, and the rTMS results showed that such activation underlies information processing.

Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) from 26 scalp sites were used to investigate whether or not and, if so, the extent to which the brain processes subserving the understanding of imageable written words and line drawings are identical. Sentences were presented one word at a time to 28 undergraduates for comprehension. Each sentence ended with either a written word (regular sentences) or with a line drawing (rebus sentences) that rendered it semantically congruous or semantically incongruous. For half of the subjects regular and rebus sentences were randomly intermixed whereas for the remaining half the regular and rebus sentences were presented in separate blocks (affording within-subject comparisons in both cases). In both presentation formats, words and line drawings generated greater negativity between 325 and 475 msec post-stimulus in ERPs to incongruous relative to congruous sentence endings (i.e., an N400-like effect). While the time course of this negativity was remarkably similar for words and pictures, there were notable differences in their scalp distributions; specifically, the classic N400 effect for words was larger posteriorly than it was for pictures. The congruity effect for pictures but not for words was also associated with a longer duration (lower frequency) negativity over frontal sites. In addition, under the mixed presentation mode, the N400 effect peaked about 30 msec earlier for pictures than for words. All in all, the data suggest that written words and pictures when they terminate sentences are processed similarly, but by at least partially nonoverlapping brain areas.

Deception is a complex cognitive activity, and different types of lies could arise from different neural systems. We investigated this possibility by first classifying lies according to two dimensions, whether they fit into a coherent story and whether they were previously memorized. fMRI revealed that well-rehearsed lies that fit into a coherent story elicit more activation in right anterior frontal cortices than spontaneous lies that do not fit into a story, whereas the opposite pattern occurs in the anterior cingulate and in posterior visual cortex. Furthermore, both types of lies elicited more activation than telling the truth in anterior prefrontal cortices (bilaterally), the parahippocampal gyrus (bilaterally), the right precuneus, and the left cerebellum. At least in part, distinct neural networks support different types of deception.