Studying the impact of green and high-quality development is of great significance to the healthy growth and sustainable development of enterprises. This paper discusses the influencing factors of the green and high-quality development of enterprises from the perspective of ownership structure and innovation ability, aiming to clarify the impact mechanism of these influencing factors on the green development of enterprises, and combined with emerging machine learning technologies, to propose a novel and effective corporate green high-quality development using a regression prediction model for quality development. Linear regression and one-way ANOVA were used to analyze the influence of each variable on the green and high-quality development of the enterprise, and the weight proportions of each influencing factor under the linear model were obtained. Two machine learning models based on the random forest (RF) algorithm and support vector machine algorithm were established, and the random parameters in the two machine learning algorithms were optimized by a genetic algorithm (GA). The reliability and accuracy of machine learning models and multivariate linear models were compared. The results show that the GA–RF model has superior regression performance compared with other prediction models. This paper provides a convenient machine learning model, which can quickly and effectively predict the green and high-quality development of enterprises, and provide help for enterprise decision-making and government policy formulation.

It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and employee stock ownership plans on cost stickiness. The study found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness of the enterprise. By reducing the adjustment costs and optimistic expectations of management and improving the performance sensitivity of executive compensation and quality of information disclosure, an employee stock ownership plan plays a role in suppressing the cost-stickiness effect of executive power. The larger the scale and the more times the employee stock ownership plan is implemented, the stronger the inhibition effect is. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. Combining the research themes of management accounting and financial accounting, this study discusses the economic consequences of ESOP from the perspective of enterprise cost control, which is helpful for internal and external stakeholders of enterprises to understand the characteristics and effects of ESOP in the new era, and also provides new evidence for enterprise cost control while enlightening policy makers and listed companies to explore the feasible mechanism of enterprise cost control from the staff level. It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and an employee stock ownership plan on cost stickiness. It is found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. This study provides new evidence for corporate cost control.

The mixed ownership reform aims to improve the property rights structure of the state−owned enterprises (SOEs) and reduce agency costs, and the current mixed reform strategies mainly include equity blending by introducing external non−state capital, executive assignments, and employee stock ownership. In this paper, 953 valid data of A−shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 are used as samples to construct the indicators of mixed reform strategy by the literature statistics method. After obtaining multiple impact indicators, the regression impact model of corporate agency cost suppression strategy is constructed by MATLAB software using a machine learning algorithm. On this basis, the performance of multiple machine learning algorithms is compared, and it is found that the integrated optimization−based bag−boosting model is used to study the effect of hybrid reform strategy to reduce the agency costs of SOEs, and the proportional setting of indicators when the effect is optimal is also explored. Finally, the laws of different influencing factors on the agency costs of enterprises are explored separately by the eigenvalue method. The results of the study show that the proportion of shareholding of the first largest non−state shareholder is sin−functional with the agency costs of SOEs when non−state majority shareholders are introduced into SOEs’ equity mix, and the agency costs tend to decrease after SOEs become privately held enterprises. The greater the number and proportion of supervisors appointed by non−state shareholders, the greater the supervisory restraint effect on SOE managers and the better the effect of suppressing agency costs. The participation of non−state−owned shareholders in the company’s business decisions by appointed executives and the special resource advantages of SOEs intensify the occurrence of the self−interest of appointed executives and the increase of agency costs of SOEs. The implementation of an employee stock ownership plan plays the role of employee supervision and restraint on SOE managers, which reduces the agency costs of SOEs. Based on this, it can provide support for the government to improve the hybrid reform policy and promote the process layer by layer, and also provide theoretical reference for SOEs to deepen the equity mix, incentivize employee shareholding, and empower non−state shareholders to govern and thus reduce agency costs.

High-quality development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is of great significance to the transformation of the dynamic energy of the Chinese economy in the new development stage and the improvement of quality and efficiency. To this end, we selected 32 evaluation indicators based on three perspectives: social responsibility, effectiveness and efficiency, and independent innovation. Then, we applied the fixed-base efficacy coefficient method and the longitudinal and horizontal pull-out gearing method to obtain the indexes for measuring the level of high-quality development of SOEs by linear weighting. On this basis, a model constructed by an integrated machine learning algorithm was used to explore the impact of changes in the ownership structure of SOEs on the level of high-quality development of enterprises. The study shows that (1) the overall development quality of SOEs has been on an upward trend since 2008, among which the quality of competitive SOEs has been on an upward trend, while the performance of public welfare SOEs is slightly less; (2) the property rights reform of SOEs introduces the shareholding ratio of the largest non-state shareholder and the level of high-quality development as a sine function, keeping the nature of state property rights unchanged, while maintaining the ratio in the range of 25.2–50%; (3) the relationship between the ratio of the share capital of the employee stock ownership plan to the total share capital and the level of high-quality development of SOEs is increasing, then decreasing, and then stabilizing, the ratio is maintained at about 5%, and the marginal effect of the employees’ motivation on the improvement of the quality of enterprise development is stronger; (4) the implementation of an employee stock ownership plan by SOEs more than twice a year can play a positive role in improving the quality of enterprise development. This can provide theoretical guidance for measuring the level of high-quality development of SOEs, reforming the ownership structure of SOEs, and promoting the process of high-quality macroeconomic development.