Antonio Romero Medina

Dr. Antonio Romero Medina


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 May 2001 in International Journal of Game Theory
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Journal Article
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KCKatarína Cechlárová
Katarína Cechlárová
KAKatarı´na
Katarı´na
AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina

1 May 2000 in Games and Economic Behavior
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Journal Article
Open access
JAJosé Alcalde
José Alcalde
AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D78.

1 October 1998 in Journal of Economic Theory
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Journal Article
Closed access
JAJosé Alcalde
José Alcalde
DPDavid Pérez-Castrillo
David Pérez-Castrillo
AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina

1 March 1998 in Review of Economic Design
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AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina

1 January 2013 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
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AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina
MTMatteo Triossi
Matteo Triossi
Artículo de publicación ISI.The absence of simultaneous cycles is a sufficient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton core

11 January 2001 in Social Choice and Welfare
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Journal Article
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AMAntonio Romero Medina
Antonio Romero Medina
The paper seeks to formalize the notion of effective freedom or the freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice used in this paper is based on the preference orderings that a reasonable person may have. I argue that only alternatives that can be selected by a reasonable person from the set of all possible alternatives provide a meaningful choice. I discuss this approach and provide an axiomatization of the cardinality rule and two lexicographic versions of this rule in this context.