Roman M.  Sheremeta

Roman M. Sheremeta


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2015 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
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EDEmmanuel Dechenaux
Emmanuel Dechenaux
DKDan Kovenock
Dan Kovenock
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.

28 April 2017 in Journal of Economic Surveys
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RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta

8 August 2014 in Journal of Conflict Resolution
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Journal Article
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SMShakun D. Mago
Shakun D. Mago
ASAnya C. Samak
Anya C. Samak
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta
We experimentally investigate the effect of social identification and information feedback on individual behavior in contests. In all treatments, we find significant overexpenditure of effort relative to the standard theoretical predictions. Identifying subjects through photo display decreases wasteful effort. Providing information feedback about others’ effort does not affect the aggregate effort, but it decreases the heterogeneity of effort and significantly affects the dynamics of individual behavior. A behavioral model that incorporates a nonmonetary utility of winning and relative payoff maximization explains significant overexpenditure of effort. It also suggests that decrease in “social distance” between group members through social identification promotes prosocial behavior and decreases overexpenditure of effort, while improved information feedback decreases the heterogeneity of effort.

1 July 2020 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
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TCTimothy N. Cason
Timothy N. Cason
WMWilliam A. Masters
William A. Masters
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta

1 January 2012 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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EDEmmanuel Dechenaux
Emmanuel Dechenaux
DKDan Kovenock
Dan Kovenock
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta
Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly efforts while competing over the distribution of a sc

27 July 2015 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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Journal Article
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CPCurtis R. Price
Curtis R. Price
RSRoman M. Sheremeta
Roman M. Sheremeta