Laboratory Research for Economy, Management and Quantitative Finance (LaREMFiQ), Institute of High Commercial Studies of Sousse, University of Sousse, Sousse, Tunisia
Prof. Dr. Lotfi Belkacem
Laboratory Research for Economy, Management and Quantitative Finance (LaREMFiQ), Institute of High Commercial Studies of Sousse, University of Sousse, Sousse, Tunisia
The opportunities in green investment have propelled the green bond market at a time when climate change has emerged as a critical issue. As more investors express a preference for environmentally responsible investments, the popularity of green bonds remains high. Such considerations motivate the exploration of the relationship between these instruments and different assets to better appreciate their potential benefits. This paper examines the relationship between green bonds and various financial markets, including conventional bonds, equities, oil, and clean energy stocks, using daily return data from July 2014 to October 2024. Hence, the cross-quantilogram approach is employed to explore how Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) and Financial Market Uncertainty (VIX) influence these dependence structures. The empirical results suggest a strong correlation between green bonds and conventional bonds. Moreover, green bonds can serve as a diversification tool for investors in stock, oil, and clean energy markets. The uncertainty measures do not provide any information that could affect the dependence structures among these markets.
In the view of the growing interest in the role of political patronage in banking, several issues are highlighted with regards to performance and behavior of politically connected banks that may differ from their non-connected peers. In this article, the effect of political patronage on bank risk taking is examined by considering the ratio of loan loss reserves as measure of credit risk for a sample of 32 banks in some Middle Eastern and North African MENA countries. In general, we find that the presence of political patronage impact significantly bank risk, both directly and indirectly, consistent with our hypothesis that politically backed banks tend to exploit the moral hazard which, will cause them behave less prudently.