Point-to-point quantum privacy communication over a standard telecommunication fiber link can be implemented by continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD). However, as communication networks develop, the two-party CV QKD system may hardly meet the requirements of secret key sharing of multiple users (at least three users). In this paper, we consider a protocol called quantum secret sharing (QSS) which allows a legitimate user, a so-called dealer, to share a secret key with multiple remote users through an insecure quantum channel. These users can correctly recover the dealer's secret key only when they work cooperatively. We carry out QSS with discretely modulated coherent states (DMCSs) because they are easy to prepare and resilient to losses. An asymptotic security proof for the proposed DMCS-based QSS protocol against both eavesdroppers and dishonest users is presented. Numerical simulation based on a linear bosonic channel shows that the maximal transmission distance of the DMCS-based QSS protocol reaches more than 100 km, and it can be further lengthened by exploiting a higher-dimensional discrete modulation strategy. Moreover, the composable security of the DMCS-based QSS protocol is also presented.

Quantum photon-catalysis operations can be utilized for improving the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) systems. Motivated by characteristics of quantum photon-catalysis operations that can be implemented by the existing technologies, we consider the performance improvement of self-referenced (SR) CVQKD involving zero-photon catalysis operation. We find that the zero-photon catalysis can be regarded as a noiseless attenuation, and the numerical simulations show that the zero-photon catalysis (ZPC)-based SR-CVQKD scheme outperforms the original SR-CVQKD scheme. In addition, to highlight the advantage of applying zero-photon catalysis operation into SR-CVQKD systems, we make a comparison about the performances between the ZPC-based SR-CVQKD scheme and the previous single-photon subtraction (SPS)-based SR-CVQKD scheme. Numerical simulations show that the ZPC-based SR-CVQKD is superior to the single-photon subtraction case with respect to the transmission distance and the tolerable excess noise. Especially, the ZPC-based SR-CVQKD allows the lower quantum detection efficiency and the higher electronic noise to achieve the same performance. These results show that the proposed protocol is expected to provide theoretical reference for the practical application of SR-CVQKD in metropolitan areas.

The practical security of a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system is compromised by various attack strategies. The existing countermeasures against these attacks are to exploit different real-time monitoring modules to prevent different types of attacks, which significantly depend on the accuracy of the estimated excess noise and lack a universal defense method. In this paper, we propose a defense strategy for CVQKD systems to address these disadvantages and resist most of the known attack types. We investigate several features of the pulses that would be affected by different types of attacks, derive a feature vector based on these features as the input of an artificial neural network (ANN) model, and show the training and testing process of the ANN model for attack detection and classification. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can effectively detect most of the known attacks at the cost of reducing a small part of secret keys and transmission distance. It establishes a universal attack detection model by simply monitoring several features of the pulses without knowing the exact type of attack in advance.

The discretely modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution (DM CVQKD) has been proven to be secure, and a basic assumption for the current theoretical security proof of the DM CVQKD is that the signal source cannot be compromised. However, this assumption is quite unpractical in real quantum communication systems. In this paper, we investigate the DM CVQKD with a special configuration in which the entanglement source is placed at the untrusted channel. With this configuration, the source is no longer protected by the sender but is exposed to the vulnerable environment. In particular, we consider the configuration for two typical DM CVQKD protocols, which are the four-state protocol and the eight-state protocol. Security analysis based on linear bosonic channel shows that the DM CVQKD with an untrusted entanglement source is able to defend itself against the most powerful quantum collective attack in a certain distance range and it can still generate positive secret key rate when considering finite-size effect and composable security, thereby providing a theoretical proof for applying the DM CVQKD system to a realistic environment.