With the upgrading of people’s consumption patterns, the omni-channel supply chain becomes the mainstream form of e-commerce platform enterprise development. Aiming at two different e-commerce enterprises, we construct an evolutionary game model for enterprises’ “online+offline” omni-channel construction strategy by self-build or cooperating with brick-and-mortar stores. It is based on the Stackelberg and Cournot competition model, combined with the omni-channel pricing strategy, using the theory of perfect rationality and bounded rationality, and combing the non-cooperative game and evolutionary game to realize. Moreover, the evolutionary game process is simulated. Through the dynamic changes of the system, the strategy selection behavior mechanism of the retail channel subjects is deeply analyzed. It is found that enterprises’ strategy choices are influenced by both competitors and profits, and evolutionary stabilization strategies are not unique. In addition, changes in consumer loyalty, physical feelings, and sharing ratio during the evolutionary process will affect the stability rate of enterprises’ behavioral choices.

Recycling channel construction plays an important role in the development of closed-loop supply chains. In particular, the emergence of online recycling channels has made up for the shortcomings of traditional recycling channels with poor information and limited markets. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model to investigate the cooperation between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms with government intervention or not. The result shows that whether an enterprise actively participates in the cooperative recycling depends on the actual cost of establishing the cooperative recycling system. Additionally, the government support and supervision will affect the actual cost of cooperation. When the actual cost of establishing a collaborative recovery system is very large, under the influence of government interventions, there will be two kinds of evolutionary results for enterprises, either with cooperation or not at the same time. On the contrary, when the actual cost is small or medium, both manufacturers and the platforms will choose to cooperate. Thus, government participation in a cooperative recovery system is the best strategic option.

The difference in consumer perceptions of product quality influences consumers’ propensity to purchase through various channels, thereby affecting the profit of e-commerce platforms and manufacturers. This factor is a critical consideration for e-commerce platforms when formulating their operational strategies in a multi-channel competitive environment. This study focuses on a product retail supply chain comprising two e -commerce platforms, two manufacturers, and strategic consumers. Innovatively, we construct a two-period dynamic pricing game model to compare commission-based and self-operated models for the platforms and deeply explore the impact of consumers’ product quality perception differences on pricing strategies and platform operation model choices. Four scenarios are considered: self-operated model under simultaneous decision-making, commission-based model under simultaneous decision-making, self-operated model under successive decision-making, and commission-based model under successive decision-making. Results show that as the probability of consumers perceiving high-quality products increases, both e-commerce platforms and manufacturers can enhance their profit by raising prices. Moreover, when platforms make decisions simultaneously, they should choose the commission-based model. In contrast, when platforms make decisions sequentially, the leader platform should choose the self-operated model, while the follower platform should choose the commission-based model. In particular, in the context of successive decision-making, after attracting consumers through the low-price strategy in the first period, the leader platform can still effectively maintain market share even if the price is raised in the second period.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only brought a virus to the public, but also spawned a large number of rumors. The Internet has made it very convenient for media websites to record and spread rumors, while the official government, as the subject of rumor control, can release rumor-refutation information to reduce the harm of rumors. Therefore, this study took into account information-carrying variables, such as media websites and official governments, and expanded the classic ISR rumor propagation model into a five-dimensional, two-level rumor propagation model that interacts between the main body layer and the information layer. Based on the constructed model, the mean field equation was obtained. Through mathematical analysis, the equilibrium point and the basic reproduction number of rumors were calculated. At the same time, stability analysis was conducted using the Routh Hurwitz stability criterion. Finally, a numerical simulation verified that when the basic regeneration number was less than 1, rumors disappeared in the system; when the basic regeneration number was greater than 1, rumors continued to exist in the system and rumors erupted. The executive power of the official government to dispel rumors, that is, the effectiveness of the government, played a decisive role in suppressing the spread of rumors.