Jonathan O Chimakonam

Prof. Dr. Jonathan O Chimakonam

University of Pretoria, Pretoria, Gauteng, South Africa
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 May 2017 in Journal of Global Ethics
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam

2 October 2015 in South African Journal of Philosophy
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam
It is now clear that the development in African philosophy in the last forty years or so has been in the area of metaphilosophy, the central focus of which has been on whether African philosophy is a pure philosophy. A sizeable chunk of this engagement was manifestly perverse, leaving little or no room for phenomenological discourses. In recent times, some African philosophers have begun agitating for a shift from metaphilosophy to theoretic and applied philosophy. In the spirit of substantive inquiries in African philosophy, conversational philosophy is articulated as one of the new schools of thought in this contemporary period. This shift requires African philosophy to define its place among the world's philosophical traditions and to find new conversations both in place (substantive issues that trouble the postcolonial African life-world) and in space (comparative and intercultural engagements with other philosophical traditions on issues of mutual concern). The aim of this essay is to present African philosophy as a respectable place riding on the crest of conversations, and to demonstrate how this particular place could be transformed into a universal space of comparative thought through conversational method. The overall idea would be to establish that the goal of reason is squarely the global expansion of thought or that the journey of ‘reason’ which begins from the philosophical place is a continuous striving toward the universal space where intercultural engagement—the very hallmark of comparative thought—is unveiled as the ultimate destination of ‘reason’. At this comparative level, varying philosophical places struggle through what Wilson Moses calls ‘creative conflict’ to unravel their similarities and areas of contrast and identify and possibly contest their differences in the light of universal tools of thought. Our methods in this essay shall be critical, evaluative and prescriptive.

1 January 2021
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam
LOL. Uchenna Ogbonnaya
L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya

4 July 2022 in Religious Studies
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam
ACAmara Esther Chimakonam
Amara Esther Chimakonam
We argue that the problem of evil, logically, stems from the unequal binary that characterizes the bivalent structure of Western discourses in the philosophy of religion. This structure pits God against the devil, but also the value of good against evil they are believed to represent. The difficulty is that those who subscribe to creationism, for example, hold that God as an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect entity created everything. Ironically, this must include evil or the devil himself. If one says He did not create evil, then one is faced with the challenge of explaining how evil emerged and how an omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect God could continue to allow evil in the world. Our strategy would be to dilute the problem by dismantling logical bivalence. With an appropriate logic background like the African truth-glut three-valued system of Ezumezu as an explanatory mechanism, we will demonstrate that the problem of evil is resolvable, even if negatively. Using the principle of value-complementarity, we will argue that the notions of good and evil are not merely opposites but complementary. In this way, God, would be construed, especially from logical ideas inspired by the viewpoint of the African Traditional world-view, as ‘harmony-God’.

23 December 2017 in Acta Academica
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam
In this paper, I employ an under-explored sub-Saharan African notion of ‘relationship’ to formulate a method that could ground discourses in African and intercultural philosophies. I claim that conversationalism, as the method is called, which is a new idea in African philosophy, might be an attractive model for thought if we take seriously the demand for equal and horizontal engagement especially in the field of intercultural philosophy. To do this, I will show what the method of conversationalism might look like in application. I will articulate a principle called Context-dependence of Value (CdV) that attempts to shift the paradigm of the truth of our propositions from the ‘facts’ which such ‘propositions’ assert to the ‘context’ in which those propositions are asserted, to show not only what makes conversationalism new but to also provide strong arguments on what makes it ultimately desirable for intercultural discourse and particularly now that some thinkers are calling for the decolonisation and Africanisation of philosophy.

2 June 2016 in South African Journal of Philosophy
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JCJonathan O Chimakonam
Jonathan O Chimakonam
Matolino and Kwindingwi in an essay “The end of ubuntu” published in this journal in 2013 argue that ubuntu has stalled both as a way of life and as an ethical theory which led them to draw the far-reaching conclusion that ubuntu has reached its end. In 2014 Metz published a rejoinder in this journal with the title “Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi” in which he gestures that the justifications on which Matolino and Kwindingwi rested their conclusion were unfounded. Reacting to Metz in an essay published in this journal in 2015 with the title “A response to Metz’s reply on the end of ubuntu”, Matolino claims that Metz’s rejoinder poses no serious threat to their original position and insists that Metz’s counter-position is not only weak but grossly indefensible. In fact, he characterises Metz’s arguments as dogmatic rather than philosophical. In this paper, I wade into this encounter, which I now tag the “Matolino-Kwindingwi-Metz debate”, not for the sake of argument but to show the philosophical significance of the “Matolino-Kwindingwi conundrum”. That ubuntu has reached its end is not a mere declaration or position or conclusion, it is a problem, one whose significance would redefine not only the sphere of ubuntu philosophy but the historicity of African philosophy as a whole. I shall argue also that though the conundrum remains decisive, I agree with Metz that the arguments marshalled in its support are not decisive. Metz on the other hand may have offered systematisation of ubuntu but I agree with Matolino that his new system may not be as impregnable as he envisages. In showing the philosophical significance of the conundrum and in showing the weaknesses in the arguments of these actors, I shall argue not for the restoration but for the re-invention of ubuntu using the tool of conversational thinking.