Paradoxes of game-theoretic reasoning have played an important role in spurring developments in interactive epistemology, the area in game theory that studies the role of the players’ beliefs, knowledge, etc. This paper describes two such paradoxes – one concerning backward induction, the other iterated weak dominance. We start with the basic epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality" in a game, describe various ‘refinements’ of this condition that have been proposed, and explain how these refinements resolve the two paradoxes. We will see that a unified epistemic picture of game theory emerges. We end with some new foundational questions uncovered by the epistemic program.
The Agreement Theorem Aumann (1976 Ann. Stat.4 , 1236–1239. ( doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654 )) states that if two Bayesian agents start with a common prior, then they cannot have common knowledge that they hold different posterior probabilities of some underlying event of interest. In short, the two agents cannot ‘agree to disagree’. This result applies in the classical domain where classical probability theory applies. But in non-classical domains, such as the quantum world, classical probability theory does not apply. Inspired principally by their use in quantum mechanics, we employ signed probabilities to investigate the epistemics of the non-classical world. We find that here, too, it cannot be common knowledge that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. However, in a non-classical domain, unlike the classical case, it can be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities to an event of interest. Finally, in a non-classical domain, it cannot be common certainty that two agents assign different probabilities, if communication of their common certainty is possible—even if communication does not take place. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Quantum contextuality, causality and freedom of choice’.