Optimization is about finding the best available object with respect to an objective function. Mathematics and quantitative sciences have been highly successful in formulating problems as optimization problems, and constructing clever processes that find optimal objects from sets of objects. As computers have become readily available to most people, optimization and optimized processes play a very broad role in societies. It is not obvious, however, that the optimization processes that work for mathematics and abstract objects should be readily applied to complex and open social systems. In this paper we set forth a framework to understand when optimization is limited, particularly for complex and open social systems.
Exploration is an integral part of learning dynamics which allows algorithms to search a space of solutions. When many algorithms simultaneously explore, this can lead to counter-intuitive effects. This paper contributes an analysis of the influence that exploration has on a multi-agent system of Q -learners in a famous congestion dilemma, the Braess paradox. I find ranges of the exploration rate for which ϵ-greedy Q -learners show chaotic and oscillatory dynamics which do not converge, and yield better than Nash equilibrium results. I decouple the dynamics endogenous to Q -learning from the exogenous exploration rate ϵ, and find that Q -learners implicitly coordinate with low exploration rates ϵ ∈ (0,0.1), but are disrupted in their coordination for larger exploration rates ϵ > 0.1. The best implicit coordination leads to a 20% reduction in average travel times which approaches the social optimum. I discuss how our results may inform multi-agent algorithm design, fit within a cognitive science perspective of cognitive noise during learning, and provide a mechanistic hypothesis for the lack of empirical evidence of the Braess Paradox in traffic systems.
The technological revolution, particularly the availability of more data and more powerful computational tools, has led to the emergence of a new scientific area called Computational Diplomacy. Our work focuses on a popular subarea of it. In recent years, there has been a surge of interest in using digital technologies to promote more participatory forms of democracy. While there are numerous potential benefits to using digital tools to enhance democracy, significant challenges must be addressed. It is essential to ensure that digital technologies are used in an accessible, equitable, and fair manner rather than reinforcing existing power imbalances. This paper investigates how digital tools can be used to help design more democratic societies by investigating three key research areas: (1) the role of digital technologies in facilitating civic engagement in collective decision-making; (2) the use of digital tools to improve transparency and accountability in governance; and (3) the potential for digital technologies to enable the formation of more inclusive and representative democracies. We argue that more research on how digital technologies can be used to support democracy upgrade is needed, and we make some recommendations for future research in this direction.
Our goal in this paper is to establish a set of criteria for understanding the meaning and sources of attributing (un)fairness to AI algorithms. To do so, we first establish that (un)fairness, like other normative notions, can be understood in a proper primary sense and in secondary senses derived by analogy. We argue that AI algorithms cannot be said to be (un)fair in the proper sense due to a set of criteria related to normativity and agency. However, we demonstrate how and why AI algorithms can be qualified as (un)fair by analogy and explore the sources of this (un)fairness and the associated problems of responsibility assignment. We conclude that more user-driven AI approaches could alleviate some of these difficulties.
We gather many perspectives on Capital and synthesize their commonalities. We provide a characterization of Capital as a historical agential system and propose a model of Capital using tools from computer science. Our model consists of propositions which, if satisfied by a specific grounding, constitute a valid model of Capital. We clarify the manners in which Capital can evolve. We claim that, when its evolution is driven by quantitative optimization processes, Capital can possess qualities of Artificial Intelligence. We find that Capital may not uniquely represent meaning, in the same way that optimization is not intentionally meaningful. We find that Artificial Intelligences like modern day Large Language Models are a part of Capital. We link our readers to a web-interface where they can interact with a part of Capital.