Xiao Meng

Prof. Xiao Meng

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 April 2023 in Education and Information Technologies
Verified
Journal Article
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XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
ZTZeyang Tian
Zeyang Tian
WXWei Xu
Wei Xu

18 March 2022 in Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience
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Journal Article
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XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
This paper focuses on the phenomenon of “big data killing” implied in e-commerce and discusses how to take the government as the lead to coordinately supervise the price discrimination behavior of e-commerce companies towards loyal customers. First, the four-party evolutionary game model of the government regulatory department, e-commerce platform, e-commerce company, and consumer is built. Second, the stability of the strategy choice of each game subject is analyzed. On this basis, the evolutionary stable strategy in the system based on First Law of Lyapunov is explored. Finally, the influences of key elements on system evolution are simulated and analyzed by MATLAB2021. Results demonstrate that (1) the government supervision mechanism can effectively supervise the price discrimination of e-commerce company based on big data to loyal customers; (2) when the government chooses the strict supervision strategy, reducing the information supervision cost of the e-commerce platform and the strict supervision cost of the government enable the government and the e-commerce platform to coordinate supervision and make the e-commerce company incline to choose the nondifferential pricing strategy; (3) when the government chooses the loose supervision strategy, reducing the information supervision cost of the e-commerce platform and increasing the probability of consumer discovering differential pricing and the penalties for differential pricing of e-commerce company enable the e-commerce platform and consumer to coordinate supervision, and make the e-commerce company incline to choose the nondifferential pricing strategy. The results of this study can provide theoretical guidance for the government and companies to make beneficial strategic decisions in the development of e-commerce.

23 December 2019 in IEEE Access
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Journal Article
Open access
HLHuan-Yan Li
Huan-Yan Li
WXWei Xu
Wei Xu
YCYanjuan Cui
Yanjuan Cui
ZWZhou Wang
Zhou Wang
XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
ZSZhi-Xiao Sun
Zhi-Xiao Sun
This paper studies the fault prediction of equipment and the decision of joint equipment maintenance in urban traffic system based on Internet of Things and big data as the background of multiple control units, and proposes a joint equipment monitoring model for multi-equipment systems composed of intelligent control units. The network method predicts the fault of the equipment and gives the equipment fault prediction process. Combining the multi-equipment system attributes of intelligent control unit, aim-ing at minimizing the total maintenance cost of control unit system, and taking the reliability of the whole system and the availability of equipment as constraints, a preventive maintenance decision model for joint equipment maintenance is established. Finally, the optimal preventive maintenance interval of the entire system is solved.

18 January 2025 in International Journal of Health Policy and Management
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Journal Article
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XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
HLHuan Liu
Huan Liu
Background: Smart health and senior care services have developed rapidly to cater to the aging society, but the corresponding regulations are not perfect. The platform and senior care service enterprises have chosen different strategies due to various factors, resulting in disorderly platform development and inefficient resource allocation. This research attempts to establish a regulatory mechanism to promote the active development of the platform. Methods: In order to mitigate opportunistic behaviors in the smart health senior care service platform, drawing from evolutionary game theory, this study establishes a decision-making model involving the government, the platform, and senior care service enterprises, and scrutinizes the evolutionary behaviors and equilibrium strategies of these three parties. Results: There are five equilibrium points among the three parties in the game, and the strategy selection shows periodic changes. The cost and level of positive government regulation, the conversion rate of smart aging construction services provided by the platform, penalties for opportunistic behavior by the platform, as well as the benefits of positive cooperation and penalties for passive cooperation by senior care service enterprises, will significantly affect the strategies of all parties involved. Conclusion: The research results indicate that establishing a regulatory mechanism for the smart health senior care service platform can promote effective cooperation between platform and senior care service enterprises. Active government regulation is the key to the smooth operation of the platform. Through quantitative analysis, the main strategic choices of participants in the smart health senior care service platform can be explained. This model can provide a reference for formulating policies related to smart senior care.

1 April 2022 in Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience
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XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
CZChang Zhai
Chang Zhai
To attract customers and landlords to join the platform is an important problem to be solved when expanding the size of the shared accommodation platform, and subsidy policies have been proven to be an effective approach in many areas of sharing. In order to analyze the strategies of all parties in the subsidy policy of the shared accommodation platform, a three-party evolutionary game model of shared accommodation platform, consumers, and landlords was built. The strategy stability of each game subject was analyzed, and the equilibrium point stability was explored based on Lyapunovs method. The game model and influencing factors were simulated and analyzed by MATLAB 2016. Results demonstrated that the consumers and landlords were promoted to join the shared accommodation platform by increasing subsidies to consumers and landlords and reducing consumers time costs and landlords service fees from the early stage to the rapid development stage of the shared accommodation platform; with the increase of the proportion of landlords share in expenses and the decrease of the opportunity loss of platform nonsubsidizing, the strategy of the platform gradually evolves from subsidy to nonsubsidy. The conclusions of this study provide guidance for the mature path of the shared accommodation platform and also give suggestions for the development of the sharing economy.

30 September 2022 in Advances in Production Engineering & Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
XMXiao Meng
Xiao Meng
ZTZ.Y Tian
Z.Y Tian