Alberto Antonioni

Dr. Alberto Antonioni

Departamento de Matematicás, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911 Leganés, Madrid, Spain
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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15 September 2021 in Nature Communications
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ASAron Szekely
Aron Szekely
FLFrancesca Lipari
Francesca Lipari
Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
MPMario Paolucci
Mario Paolucci
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
GAGiulia Andrighetto
Giulia Andrighetto
Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change to reducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength of the norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.

8 June 2017 in Physical Review Letters
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Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
ACAlessio Cardillo
Alessio Cardillo
Despite the large number of studies on synchronization, the hypothesis that interactions bear a cost for involved individuals has seldom been considered. The introduction of costly interactions leads, instead, to the formulation of a dichotomous scenario in which an individual may decide to cooperate and pay the cost in order to get synchronized with the rest of the population. Alternatively, the same individual can decide to free ride, without incurring any cost, waiting for others to get synchronized to his or her state. Thus, the emergence of synchronization may be seen as the byproduct of an evolutionary game in which individuals decide their behavior according to the benefit-to-cost ratio they accrued in the past. We study the onset of cooperation and synchronization in networked populations of Kuramoto oscillators and report how topology is essential in order for cooperation to thrive. We also display how different classes of topology foster synchronization differently both at microscopic and macroscopic levels.

1 May 2016 in Europhysics Letters
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MJMarco Alberto Javarone
Marco Alberto Javarone
Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
FCFrancesco Caravelli
Francesco Caravelli
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest neighbors. However, whenever we study social systems, the evolution of a population might be affected also by social behaviors as conformism, stubbornness, altruism, and selfishness. Although the term evolution can assume different meanings depending on the considered domain, here it corresponds to the set of processes that lead a system towards an equilibrium or a steady state. We map fitness to the agents' payoff so that richer agents are those most imitated by fitness-driven agents, while conformity-driven agents tend to imitate the strategy assumed by the majority of their neighbors. Numerical simulations aim to identify the nature of the transition, on varying the amount of the relative density of conformity-driven agents in the population, and to study the nature of related equilibria. Remarkably, we find that conformism generally fosters ordered cooperative phases and may also lead to bistable behaviors.

1 March 2014 in Journal of Theoretical Biology
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Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
MTMarco Tomassini
Marco Tomassini
PBPierre Buesser
Pierre Buesser

4 October 2021 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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FGFrancesca Giardini
Francesca Giardini
DVDaniele Vilone
Daniele Vilone
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
When there is an opportunity to gain a positive reputation, individuals are more willing to sacrifice their immediate self-interest. Partner choice creates opportunities for competitive altruism, i.e. individuals compete to be regarded as more generous and to be chosen for future partnerships. Tests of the competitive altruism hypothesis have focused so far on reputation based on direct observation, whereas the role of gossip has not been theoretically and empirically addressed. Partner choice can create an incentive to cooperate and to send truthful messages, but it can also work in the opposite direction. In order to understand the consequences of partner choice on cooperation and gossip, we designed an experimental study in which participants played a sequence of Public Goods games and gossip rounds. In our two treatments, we observed that cooperation increased when there was an opportunity to be selected, but also that cooperators sent more honest messages than defectors, and that this strategy was prevalent in the treatment in which inter-group competition was implemented. We also found evidence that participants detached themselves from the information more often when lying. Taken together, our study fills a theoretical and empirical gap by showing that partner choice increases both cooperation and honesty of gossip. This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling’.

1 February 2014 in Europhysics Letters
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ASAttila Szolnoki
Attila Szolnoki
Alberto AntonioniAlberto Antonioni
Alberto Antonioni
MTMarco Tomassini
Marco Tomassini
Matjaz PercMatjaz Perc
Matjaz Perc