Yingjian Yan

Yingjian Yan


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 October 2022 in Entropy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YCYajing Chang
Yajing Chang
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
CZChunsheng Zhu
Chunsheng Zhu
PGPengfei Guo
Pengfei Guo
The side-channel security of lattice-based post-quantum cryptography has gained extensive attention since the standardization of post-quantum cryptography. Based on the leakage mechanism in the decapsulation stage of LWE/LWR-based post-quantum cryptography, a message recovery method, with templates and cyclic message rotation targeting the message decoding operation, was proposed. The templates were constructed for the intermediate state based on the Hamming weight model and cyclic message rotation was used to construct special ciphertexts. Using the power leakage during operation, secret messages in the LWE/LWR-based schemes were recovered. The proposed method was verified on CRYSTAL-Kyber. The experimental results demonstrated that this method could successfully recover the secret messages used in the encapsulation stage, thereby recovering the shared key. Compared with existing methods, the power traces required for templates and attack were both reduced. The success rate was significantly increased under the low SNR, indicating a better performance with lower recovery cost. The message recovery success rate could reach 99.6% with sufficient SNR.

1 November 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YZYi-Lun Zhang
Yi-Lun Zhang
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
JLJunwei Li
Junwei Li
MLMin Liu
Min Liu
With the rapid development of integrated circuits and microsystems, the security of this IC industry is getting more and more attention [1]. Therefore, there may be malicious circuit insertion at various stages, resulting in functional failure, performance degradation. In order to prevent the circuit from being plugged into the hardware Trojan, there are now some hardware Trojan protection technologies, including logic encryption, BISA technology and so on. Among them, logic encryption technology makes it difficult for hardware Trojan attackers to insert Trojans for rare nodes by obfuscating the circuits. This paper proposes a novel hardware Trojan protection technology based on logic encryption, which not only defenses against this attack technique of Hamming distance, but also proposes a fake rare node to confuse the circuit.

22 October 2013 in Journal of Electronics (China)
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
JYJingchao Yu
Jingchao Yu
PGPengfei Guo
Pengfei Guo
JGJianfei Guo
Jianfei Guo

27 July 2022 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PGPengfei Guo
Pengfei Guo
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
BYBin Ye
Bin Ye
CZChunsheng Zhu
Chunsheng Zhu
LZLichao Zhang
Lichao Zhang
LCLin Chen
Lin Chen
Cache attacks exploit the hardware vulnerabilities inherent to modern processors and pose a new threat to Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Intuitively, different cache parameter configurations directly impact the attack effectiveness, but the current research on this issue is not systematic or comprehensive enough. This paper’s primary focus is to evaluate how different cache parameter configurations affect access-driven attacks. We build a flexible and configurable simulation verification environment based on the Chipyard framework. To reduce the interference of other factors, we established a baseline for each category of parameter evaluation. We propose a novel evaluation model, called Key Score Scissors Differential (KSSD), for evaluating common private and shared cache parameters under the local and cross-core attack models, respectively; among these are private cache replacement policy, private cache capacity, cache line size, private cache associativity, shared cache capacity, and shared cache associativity. Ours is the first evaluation of the shared cache under a cross-core attack model. As a result of the evaluation, the quantitative metrics can provide a reliable indication of information leakage level under the current cache configuration, which is helpful for attackers, defenders, and evaluators. Furthermore, we provide detailed explanations and discussions of inconsistent findings by comparing our results with the existing literature.

15 December 2022 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZZZhen Zheng
Zhen Zheng
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
YLYanjiang Liu
Yanjiang Liu
LLLinyuan Li
Linyuan Li
YCYajing Chang
Yajing Chang
The test vector leakage assessment (TVLA) is a widely used side-channel power leakage detection technology which requires evaluators to collect as many power traces as possible to ensure accuracy. However, as the total sample size of the power traces increases, the amount of redundant information will also increase, thus limiting the detection efficiency. To address this issue, we propose a principal component analysis (PCA)-TVLA-based leakage detection framework which realizes a more advanced balance of accuracy and efficiency. Before implementing TVLA to detect leakage, we project the original power data onto their most significant feature dimensions extracted by the PCA procedure and screen power traces according to the magnitude of their corresponding components in the variance of the projection vector. We verified the overall performance of the proposed framework by measuring the detection capability and efficiency with t-values and the required time, respectively. The results show that compared with similar existing schemes, under the best circumstances, the proposed framework decreases the t-value by 4.3% while saving time by 25.2% on the MCU platform and decreases the t-value by 2.4% while saving time by 38.0% on the FPGA platform.

16 October 2023 in ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YCYajing Chang
Yajing Chang
YYYingjian Yan
Yingjian Yan
CZChunsheng Zhu
Chunsheng Zhu
YLYanjiang Liu
Yanjiang Liu
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has become the most promising cryptographic scheme against the threat of quantum computing to conventional public-key cryptographic schemes. Saber, as the finalist in the third round of the PQC standardization procedure, presents an appealing option for embedded systems due to its high encryption efficiency and accessibility. However, side-channel attack (SCA) can easily reveal confidential information by analyzing the physical manifestations, and several works demonstrate that Saber is vulnerable to SCAs. In this work, a ciphertext comparison method for masking design based on bitslicing technique and zerotest is proposed, which balances the trade-off between the performance and security of comparing two arrays. The mathematical description of the proposed ciphertext comparison method is provided, and its correctness and security metrics are analyzed under the concept of PINI. Moreover, a high-order masking approach based on the state-of-the-art, including the hash functions, centered binomial sampling, masking conversions, and proposed ciphertext comparison is presented, using the bitslicing technique to improve throughput. As a proof of concept, the proposed implementation of Saber is on the ARM Cortex-M4. The performance results show that the run-time overhead factor of 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-order masking is 3.01x, 5.58x, and 8.68x, and the dynamic memory used for 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-order masking is 17.4kB, 24.0kB, and 30.2kB, respectively. The SCA-resilience evaluation results illustrate that the first-order Test Vectors Leakage Assessment (TVLA) result fails to reveal the secret key with 100,000 traces.