Ola Svenson

Prof. Ola Svenson


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 February 2008 in Acta Psychologica
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson

2 June 2005 in Cognition, Technology & Work
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson
CPChristopher J. D. Patten
Christopher J. D. Patten

31 May 2008 in Applied Cognitive Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson

1 August 2009 in Judgment and Decision Making
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson
ISIlkka Salo
Ilkka Salo
TLTorun Lindholm
Torun Lindholm
Participants decided whom of two patients to prioritize for surgery in three studies. The factual quantitative information about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery) was given in vignette form with case descriptions on Visual Analogue Scales — VAS’s. Differentiation and Consolidation theory predicts that not only the attractiveness of facts but also the mental representations of objective facts themselves will be restructured in post-decision processes in support of a decision (Svenson, 2003). After the decision, participants were asked to reproduce the objective facts about the patients. The results showed that distortions of objective facts were used to consolidate a prior decision. The consolidation process relied on facts initially favoring the non-chosen alternative and on facts rated as less, rather than more important.

10 February 2017 in Transport Reviews
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson
GEGabriella Eriksson
Gabriella Eriksson
This paper provides a review of research performed by Svenson with colleagues and others work on mental models and their practical implications. Mental models describe how people perceive and think about the world including covariances and relationships between different variables, such as driving speed and time. Research on mental models has detected the time-saving bias [Svenson, O. (1970). A functional measurement approach to intuitive estimation as exemplified by estimated time savings. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 204–210]. It means that drivers relatively overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing speed from an already high speed, for example, 90–130 km/h, and underestimate the time that can be saved by increasing speed from a low speed, for example, 30–45 km/h. In congruence with this finding, mean speed judgments and perceptions of mean speeds are also biased and higher speeds given too much weight and low speeds too little weight in comparison with objective reality. Replacing or adding a new speedometer in the car showing min per km eliminated or weakened the time-saving bias. Information about braking distances at different speeds did not improve overoptimistic judgments of braking capacity, but information about collision speed with an object suddenly appearing on the road did improve judgments of braking capacity. This is relevant to drivers, politicians and traffic regulators.

1 May 2018 in Judgment and Decision Making
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
OSOla Svenson
Ola Svenson
NGNichel Gonzalez
Nichel Gonzalez
GEGabriella Eriksson
Gabriella Eriksson
We used correlation and spectral analyses to investigate the cognitive structures and processes producing biased judgments. We used 5 different sets of driving problems to exemplify problems that trigger biases, specifically: (1) underestimation of the impact of occasional slow speeds on mean speed judgments, (2) overestimation of braking capacity after a speed increase, (3) the time saving bias (overestimation of the time saved by increasing a high speed further, and underestimation of time saved when increasing a low speed), (4) underestimation of increase of fatal accident risk when speed is increased, and (5) underestimation of the increase of stopping distance when speed is increased. The results verified the predicted biases. A correlation analysis found no strong links between biases; only accident risk and stopping distance biases were correlated significantly. Spectral analysis of judgments was used to identify different decision rules. Most participants were consistent in their use of a single rule within a problem set with the same bias. The participants used difference, average, weighed average and ratio rules, all producing biased judgments. Among the rules, difference rules were used most frequently across the different biases. We found no personal consistency in the rules used across problem sets. The complexity of rules varied across problem sets for most participants.