Following an emotional experience, individuals are confronted with the persistence of ruminative thoughts that disturb the undertaking of other activities. In the present study, we experimentally tested the idea that experiencing a negative emotion triggers a ruminative process that drains working memory (WM) resources normally devoted to other tasks. Undergraduate participants of high versus low WM capacity were administered the operation-word memory span test (OSPAN) as a measure of availability of WM resources preceding and following the presentation of negative emotional versus neutral material. Rumination was assessed immediately after the second OSPAN session and at a 24-hr delay. Results showed that both the individual's WM capacity and the emotional valence of the material influenced WM performance and the persistence of ruminative thoughts. Following the experimental induction, rumination mediated the relationship between the negative emotional state and the concomitant WM performance. Based on these results, we argue that ruminative processes deplete WM resources, making them less available for concurrent tasks; in addition, rumination tends to persist over time. These findings have implications for the theoretical modeling of the long-term effects of emotions in both daily life and clinical contexts.

Flashbulb memories are defined as vivid and long-lasting memories for the reception context of an important public event (Brown & Kulik, 1977). They are supposed to be triggered by both emotional reactions to the original event and rehearsal processes (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Finkenauer, Luminet, Gisle, El-Ahmadi, van der Linden, & Philippot, 1998; Neisser & Harsch, 1992). A test-retest design (21 vs 524 days after the event on average) was employed to assess flashbulb memory and event memory for the September 11th attacks and the impact of their emotional and rehearsal predictors in a sample of 985 respondents coming from six countries (i.e., Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Japan, and the USA). Results showed that national membership had a significant impact on event memory, and the emotional and rehearsal variables, but flashbulb memories for the September 11th attacks were found to be high and consistent across different countries. The implications of these findings for the debate about the nature and maintenance of flashbulb memories are discussed.

Flashbulb memories are vivid and long-lasting memories for the reception context of an important public event (Brown & Kulik, 1977). They are assumed to be triggered by emotional factors (i.e., intensity of emotional feeling, appraisal of the original event) and by social factors (i.e., social sharing of the news, following media debate about the event). The present study investigated the memory for the death of the former President of France F. Mitterrand in two social groups, i.e., French and Belgian people. This study tests whether the flashbulb memory attributes, the memory for the original event, and the impact of the emotional and social determinants of flashbulb memory differed across groups. The results indicated that the flashbulb memory for Mitterrand's death is affected by group provenance, as French people showed higher levels of recall for the flashbulb memory attributes and their determinants than Belgian people. Time impaired recollections in both groups, so that flashbulb memories appear prone to decay and share the same destiny as ordinary memories. The theoretical construct of concern--as the most basic antecedent of emotional experiences and its related appraisal (Frijda, 1994)--is discussed in order to explain the differences in memory of the two social groups.

After an emotional episode individuals need to talk about their experiences in a repetitive process called social sharing of emotions. In the present study we adopted a longitudinal design over a 9-month period to achieve 2 main goals: First, we aimed to investigate the relationship between social sharing and recovery from an initial emotional experience; second, we tested a model of prediction of the perpetuation of social sharing over time. Findings confirm that social sharing is a common consequence of experiencing an emotion, regardless of participants' levels of education, which tends to diminish over time, leading to an increasing sense of recovery. The prolongation of social sharing is a maladaptive outcome of experiencing an emotion, and a poor recovery is a direct consequence of long-term self-perpetuating social sharing. The results have implications for the assessment of the role of both dispositional factors and characteristics of the eliciting event on the prolongation of social sharing of emotions.

The human ability of identifying, processing and regulating emotions from social stimuli is generally referred as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Within EI, Ability EI identifies a performance measure assessing individual skills at perceiving, using, understanding and managing emotions. Previous models suggest that a brain “somatic marker circuitry” (SMC) sustains emotional sub-processes included in EI. Three primary brain regions are included: the amygdala, the insula and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Here, our aim was to investigate the relationship between Ability EI scores and SMC activity during social judgment of emotional faces. Sixty-three healthy subjects completed a test measuring Ability EI and underwent fMRI during a social decision task (i.e. approach or avoid) about emotional faces with different facial expressions. Imaging data revealed that EI scores are associated with left insula activity during social judgment of emotional faces as a function of facial expression. Specifically, higher EI scores are associated with greater left insula activity during social judgment of fearful faces but also with lower activity of this region during social judgment of angry faces. These findings indicate that the association between Ability EI and the SMC activity during social behavior is region- and emotion-specific.