Davide Battisti

Dr. Davide Battisti


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 February 2025 in Philosophy & Technology
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DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
The development of AI tools, such as large language models and speech emotion and facial expression recognition systems, has raised new ethical concerns about AI’s impact on human relationships. While much of the debate has focused on human-AI relationships, less attention has been devoted to another class of ethical issues, which arise when AI mediates human-to-human relationships. This paper opens the debate on these issues by analyzing the case of romantic relationships, particularly those in which one partner uses AI tools, such as ChatGPT, to resolve a conflict and apologize. After reviewing some possible, non-exhaustive, explanations for the moral wrongness of using AI tools in such cases, I introduce the notion of second-person authenticity: a form of authenticity that is assessed by the other person in the relationship (e.g., a partner). I then argue that at least some actions within romantic relationships should respect a standard of authentic conduct since the value of such actions depends on who actually performs them and not only on the quality of the outcome produced. Therefore, using AI tools in such circumstances may prevent agents from meeting this standard. I conclude by suggesting that the proposed theoretical framework could also apply to other human-to-human relationships, such as the doctor-patient relationship, when these are mediated by AI; I offer some preliminary reflections on such applications.

3 September 2022 in Social Epistemology
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CMCarlo Martini
Carlo Martini
DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
FBFederico Bina
Federico Bina
MCMonica Consolandi
Monica Consolandi
Knowledge brokers are among the main channels of communication between scientists and the public and a key element to establishing a relation of trust between the two. But translating knowledge from the scientific community to a wider audience presents several difficulties, which can be accentuated in times of crisis. In this paper we study some of the problems that knowledge brokers face when communicating in times of crisis. During the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, we collected interviews with Italian experts that played a major role as knowledge brokers in the local media. We asked them questions about five main topics: the features and role of science communicators; the use of language in communicating science; the importance of the relation of trust with the public; the peculiarity of communicating in a context of emergency; the problem of disagreement among experts, and its public perception and communication. The goal of this paper is to understand, through the words of knowledge brokers themselves, what they consider as best practices (and obstacles) to create trust between scientists and the public. Our empirical work can inform normative accounts of what knowledge brokering should be about.

24 August 2023 in Journal of Medical Ethics
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DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
SCSilvia Camporesi
Silvia Camporesi
This paper puts forward a wish list of requirements for formal fairness in the specific context of triage in emergency departments (EDs) and maps the empirical and conceptual research questions that need to be addressed in this context in the near future. The pandemic has brought to the fore the necessity for public debate about how to allocate resources fairly in a situation of great shortage. However, issues of fairness arise also outside of pandemics: decisions about how to allocate resources are structurally unavoidable in healthcare systems, as value judgements underlie every allocative decision, although they are not always easily identifiable. In this paper, we set out to bridge this gap in the context of EDs. In the first part, we propose five formal requirements specifically applied for ED triage to be considered fair and legitimate: publicity, accessibility, relevance, standardisability and accountability. In the second part of the paper, we map the conceptual and empirical ethics questions that will need to be investigated to assess whether healthcare systems guarantee a formally just ED triage. In conclusion, we argue that there is a vast research landscape in need of an in-depth conceptual and empirical investigation in the context of ED triage in ordinary times. Addressing both types of questions in this context is vital for promoting a fair and legitimate ED triage and for fostering reflection on formal fairness allocative issues beyond triage.

2 April 2021 in Bioethics
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DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
Assisted reproductive technologies have greatly increased our control over reproductive choices, leading some bioethicists to argue that we face unprecedented moral obligations towards progeny. Several models attempting to balance the principle of procreative autonomy with these obligations have been proposed. The least demanding is the minimal threshold model (MTM), according to which every reproductive choice is permissible, except creating children whose lives will not be worth living. Hence, as long as the future child is likely to have a life worth living, prospective parents may be allowed to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to select embryos with genetic diseases or disabilities. Assuming a consequentialist person‐affecting view of morality, this paper investigates whether the MTM is an appropriate tool to guide procreative decisions given the continuous development of reproductive genetic technologies. In particular, I consider germline genome editing (GGE) and I argue that its application in human reproduction, unlike PGD, should be conceived as person‐affecting towards future progeny. I claim that even if we assume the plausibility of the MTM within PGD, we are committed to accepting that a greater moral obligation towards progeny should guide procreative decisions if GGE were available. In this case, the MTM should no longer be considered an appropriate instrument to guide procreative choices. Finally, I investigate when we face this greater moral obligation, concluding that it applies only when prospective parents have already engaged in the in vitro fertilization process.

14 March 2023 in Bioethics
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DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person‐affecting constraints. I propose the parent–child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person‐affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person‐affecting morality.

29 January 2026 in AI & SOCIETY
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MAMarco Annoni
Marco Annoni
DBDavide Battisti
Davide Battisti
BMBeatrice Marchegiani
Beatrice Marchegiani
Can an AI truly be your digital twin? Technology companies, startups, and even academic researchers increasingly claim so. From grief-bots that promise to let you talk with deceased loved ones to clinical tools designed to predict patients' treatment preferences, personalized Large Language Models are being marketed as faithful replications of individual identity, personality, and values. The digital twin label—borrowed from industrial engineering, where it describes computational models precisely mirroring physical systems—lends these claims an aura of scientific credibility. But is this metaphor appropriate, or is it dangerously misleading? This paper argues that applying the digital twin metaphor to personalized LLMs constitutes a systematic mischaracterization with serious ethical consequences. To this end, we first outline three plausible interpretations of the PDT metaphor—behaviorist, representational, and phenomenal. We then show that current AI systems do not satisfy the conditions of any of these interpretations, rendering the PDT metaphor ultimately inappropriate. The consequences of this metaphorical overreach are far from When vulnerable individuals—grieving families, patients facing incapacity, people seeking psychological support—interact with systems marketed as preserving human essence, they risk forming attachments to sophisticated illusions. The metaphor fosters misplaced trust, distorts public understanding of AI capabilities, and shapes policy debates on false premises. As these technologies proliferate into healthcare, legal proceedings, and intimate relationships, metaphorical precision becomes an ethical imperative. We conclude by proposing alternative frameworks that honestly represent what these systems can and cannot do.