The commercialization of eco-friendly hydrogen vehicles has elicited attempts to expand hydrogen refueling stations in urban areas; however, safety measures to reduce the risk of jet fires have not been established. The RISKCURVES software was used to evaluate the individual and societal risks of hydrogen refueling stations in urban areas, and the F–N (Frequency–Number of fatalities) curve was used to compare whether the safety measures satisfied international standards. From the results of the analysis, it was found that there is a risk of explosion in the expansion of hydrogen refueling stations in urban areas, and safety measures should be considered. To lower the risk of hydrogen refueling stations, this study applied the passive and active independent protection layers (IPLs) of LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis) and confirmed that these measures significantly reduced societal risk as well as individual risk and met international standards. In particular, such measures could effectively reduce the impact of jet fire in dispensers and tube trailers that had a high risk. Measures employing both IPL types were efficient in meeting international standard criteria; however, passive IPLs were found to have a greater risk reduction effect than active IPLs. The combination of RISKCURVES and LOPA is an appropriate risk assessment method that can reduce work time and mitigate risks through protective measures compared to existing risk assessment methods. This method can be applied to risk assessment and risk mitigation not only for hydrogen facilities, but also for hazardous materials with high fire or explosion risk.

For the safe utilization and management of hydrogen energy within a fuel-cell room in a hydrogen-fueled house, an explosion test was conducted to evaluate the potential hazards associated with hydrogen accident scenarios. The overpressure and heat radiation were measured for an explosion accident at distances of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 m for hydrogen–air mixing ratios of 10%, 25%, 40%, and 60%. When the hydrogen–air mixture ratio was 40%, the greatest overpressure was 24.35 kPa at a distance of 1 m from the fuel-cell room. Additionally, the thermal radiation was more than 1.5 kW/m², which could cause burns at a distance of 5 m from the hydrogen fuel-cell room. Moreover, a thermal radiation in excess of 1.5 kW/m² was computed at a distance of 3 m from the hydrogen fuel-cell room when the hydrogen–air mixing ratio was 25% and 60%. Consequently, an explosion in the hydrogen fuel-cell room did not considerably affect fatality levels, but could affect the injury levels and temporary threshold shifts. Furthermore, the degree of physical damage did not reach major structural damage levels, causing only minor structural damage.