The agricultural supply chain has to balance the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainability. This paper investigates the green agricultural supply chain, consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, who are both altruistic towards consumers. Such consumer-oriented altruism is different from the widely adopted enterprise-oriented altruism, which only measures the altruistic behaviors among supply chain enterprises. In the approach of game theory, the optimal operational decision is obtained, and thereby the economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainability are described rationally and attained, respectively. The impacts of consumer-oriented altruism on the sustainability of the green agricultural supply chain are analyzed and compared in a systematic way. A case study is carried out before drawing conclusions and managerial implications. The findings can be concluded as follows. Firstly, consumer-oriented altruism changes the operational performance of the green agricultural supply chain by enhancing the green level of agricultural products, cutting down the pricing decisions and marginal profit of each supply chain enterprise. Secondly, consumer-oriented altruism simultaneously facilitates each dimension of sustainability to different extents, and economic sustainability is promoted the most prominently, whereas environmental sustainability is improved the least. Thirdly, the retailer’s consumer-oriented altruism always improves each dimension of sustainability more than the manufacturer’s altruism does, and the advantage in the economic dimension is the most significant, while that in the environmental dimension is the smallest.

To enhance product greenness and operational performance, this study designs a Nash bargaining contract incorporating consumer environmental awareness in an agricultural supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer shares partial green costs to improve greenness and efficiency. Using game theory, theoretical models for competitive scenario without Nash bargaining, local cooperative scenario with given ratio, and global cooperative scenario with Nash bargaining are constructed. Through comparison and sensitivity analysis, the enhancements from Nash bargaining are explored, and the effects of consumer environmental awareness on these enhancements are examined. The findings reveal several key insights. First, the process of bargaining determines the optimal contract ratio, which also depends on the magnitude of price sensitivity, marginal green costs, and consumer environmental awareness. Second, the Nash bargaining contract significantly improves product greenness, increases retail prices, and boosts profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, consumer environmental awareness amplifies the effectiveness of the Nash bargaining contract, leading to greener products, higher prices, and greater overall supply chain profits. This research contributes to agricultural supply chain management by providing a theoretically rigorous Nash bargaining mechanism alongside a real-world case study, which harmonizes environmental stewardship and economic viability in agricultural supply chains. The findings offer actionable insights for supply chain managers and policymakers seeking to promote green innovation while maintaining profitability.