There is growing interest in the impact of climate change on agricultural labor supply in China, rigorous empirical evidence for this issue is insufficient. This potentially important channel through which climate change may affect agricultural labor supply has not received attention. Using a panel survey data of 100 administrative villages and 2977 farmers in China, we find that temperature and precipitation do affect farmers’ labor allocation, 1°C increase from the current average temperature will reduce agricultural labor supply by 0.252%, and 1mm increase from the current average rainfall will reduce agricultural labor supply by 0.001%. Climate change also leads to the decline of net agricultural income, which creates distorted incentives for households to over-supply labor to non-agriculture. Moreover, farmers with relatively lower risk tolerance preferred to reduce the current supply of agricultural labor when net agricultural income is projected to decrease under climate change scenarios.

The general view is that land ownership affirmation provides incentives for farmers to internalize external benefits, optimizes farmers’ allocation of agricultural production factors, and then reduces farmers’ farmland wastage behavior. This study examines the influence of residual control and claim rights in farmland right confirmation on farmers’ farmland wastage behavior. Results show that residual control rights guarantee the farmers’ exclusive right to use the farmland independently, and residual claim stimulates the farmers to pursue the goal of agricultural production surplus value. However, the residual claim rights are related to the constraint conditions of agricultural production; thus, the farmland right confirmation is situational dependent on farmers’ farmland wastage behavior. The surplus value of the farming output of low-income families is low, and the willingness to realize the surplus claim through agricultural reproduction is weak. Residual control reduces the risk of land loss, accelerates the transfer of the labor force, and shows the behavior of farmland wastage. Nonpoor households with high agricultural production surplus value tend to increase the allocation of agrarian production factors to maximize the income, improve the allocation efficiency of agricultural land resources, and reduce farmland wastage behavior. Conclusion: The implementation effect of accurate farmland affirmation is progressive and internally unbalanced. The institutional basis of matching policy should be to deal with the relationship between residual control right and residual claim right.