In many developing countries, the existence of the uncertified recycler seriously hinders the healthy development of the waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE or e-waste) recycling industry. As a result, how the government can regulate the uncertified recycler to improve environment and public health during the recycling processes has become a critical issue. To help tackle this issue, we build an evolutionary game model to study the interactions between the government and the uncertified recycler. We conduct stability analysis of each participant and obtain four asymptotically stable states. Furthermore, we conduct numerical simulations for comparative analysis based on the current situation of the Chinese e-waste recycling industry. Our results are as follows. First, there exist multiple asymptotically stable states for the government and the uncertified recycler, namely (no-governance, maintaining status quo), (governance, maintaining status quo), (governance, industrial upgrading), and (no-governance, industrial upgrading). Then, we verify the validity of the evolutionary game model through numerical simulations and find that penalty, supervision cost, additional investment cost, and financial subsidy can significantly influence the behavioral strategy of the government and the uncertified recycler. Finally, we find that the government should adopt the reward-penalty-supervision mechanism to promote the healthy development of the e-waste recycling industry and protect the environment and public health. Specifically, first, the government’s subsidy for the uncertified recycler has upper and lower limits. Exceeding the upper limit will result in an excessive financial burden to the government, while falling below the lower limit will hinder the uncertified recycler from technology upgrading. Second, the government should strengthen the supervision of the uncertified recycler and increase the punishment for violations. Third, the government should focus on controlling the supervision cost. Fourth, according to the asymptotically stable state (no-governance, industrial upgrading), the government should prepare to withdraw from the market when the uncertified recycler chooses industrial upgrading.

This paper explores two Omnichannel retail models consisted of one online platform and one brick-and-mortar store under different power structures considering cost-sharing mechanisms. In retail supply chain dominated by the online platform and brick-and-mortar store, respectively, under a “Buy online and pick up in store” strategy, the influences of the cost-sharing ratio and the proportion of traditional consumers on pricing and service decisions, the demands of various groups of consumers, and the performance of the retail system have been examined. In addition, the results of decision-making and profitabilities of retailers under different power structures have also been considered. The key findings show that the optimal price and service level first increase and then decrease with the cost-sharing ratio in a retail system dominated by the online platform. In contrast, the price and service level increase with the cost-sharing ratio only when the proportion of traditional consumers is relatively large in a retail system dominated by brick-and-mortar store. The symmetry demand increases as the scale of traditional consumers shrinks when the cost-sharing ratio is relatively large in a retail system dominated by the online system. At the same time, it only increases when the cost-sharing ratio is in the range of $\left(5/8,5/6\right)$ in a retail system dominated by the brick-and-mortar store. No matter what the power structure is, the profit of the retail system always first increases and then decreases with the proportion of traditional consumers. Additionally, when the cost-sharing ratio and the proportion of traditional consumers are relatively small, the total demand in the retail system dominated by the online platform is higher than that in the retail system dominated by the brick-and-mortar store. The total profit is larger in the online platform-dominated retail system than that in the brick-and-mortar store-dominated retail system when the cost-sharing ratio is relatively high. However, when the cost-sharing ratio is relatively low, the profitability of the brick-and-mortar store-dominated retail system is stronger.