Reducing agricultural carbon emissions is required to reach the goal of carbon neutrality and mitigate the effects of climate change. With the advent of the digital economy, we aimed to determine if digital village construction can achieve carbon reduction in agriculture. As such, in this study, we used balanced panel data for 30 provinces in China from 2011 to 2020 to conduct an empirical analysis based on measuring the digital village construction level in each province. We found the following: Firstly, digital village construction is conducive to reducing the carbon emitted from agriculture, and the results of further tests showed that the carbon reduction effect of digital villages is mainly based on the reduction in carbon emissions from chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Secondly, the digital village construction has a stronger inhibiting effect on agricultural carbon emissions in major grain-producing areas than in non-major grain-producing areas. The level of rural human capital is the limiting condition for digital village construction to enable green agricultural development; in areas with higher levels of human capital, digital village construction has a significant inhibiting effect on agricultural carbon emissions. The above conclusions are valuable for the future promotion of digital village construction and the design of a green development model for agriculture.
Based on the perspective of combining informal and formal systems, this paper empirically explores the impact of neighborhood effects and policy interventions on the deviation of farmers’ willingness and behavior of domestic waste separation (DWS) by using data from the China Land Economy Survey (CLES) and constructing a probit model. It should be explained that the neighborhood effect in this paper refers to the fact that the behavior of farmers is highly susceptible to the behavior of their neighbors in the process of production and living. The results of the study show that neighborhood effects and policy interventions have a significant negative impact on the deviation of farmers’ willingness and behavior of DWS, respectively. Comparison of marginal effects shows that neighborhood effects > environmental advocacy > reward and punishment policies. From the interaction effects as a whole, neighborhood effects and policy interventions have complementary effects on the deviation of farmers’ willingness and behavior of DWS, with the complementary effects of neighborhood effects and environmental advocacy being more significant. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that neighborhood effects completely replace the inhibitory effect of policy interventions on the deviation of high-income farmers’ willingness and behavior of DWS, but have no effect on political elite farmers. The interaction between neighborhood effects and policy interventions has complementary effects on low-income farmers and ordinary farmers, with the complementary effects of neighborhood effects and environmental advocacy being more significant.