Konstantinos Serfes

Dr. Konstantinos Serfes

School of Economics, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 October 2004 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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QLQihong Liu
Qihong Liu
Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes

18 October 2013 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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QLQihong Liu
Qihong Liu
Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes

15 December 2006 in The Journal of Industrial Economics
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HKHyunho Kim
Hyunho Kim
Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes

5 October 2007 in International Journal of Game Theory
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Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes

31 July 2020 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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SHSuting Hong
Suting Hong
Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes
VTVeikko Thiele
Veikko Thiele

1 October 2021 in Management Science
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SLSusan Feng Lu
Susan Feng Lu
Konstantinos SerfesKonstantinos Serfes
Konstantinos Serfes
GWGerard Wedig
Gerard Wedig
BWBingxiao Wu
Bingxiao Wu
Competition plays an ambiguous role in nursing home markets where public and private payers coexist. Using U.S. nursing home data with a wide range of market structures, we find a U-shaped relationship between competition and service quality when nursing homes serve a mix of public and private segments, and a monotonically increasing relationship when nursing homes mostly serve the public, price-regulated, segment. The outcomes can be explained by the interplay of two opposing effects of competition: the reputation-building effect, whereby competing firms choose high quality to build a good reputation, and the rent-extraction effect, whereby competition hinders investment for quality improvements by lowering price premia. These observations are consistent with a repeated game model that incorporates public and private-payer segments. This paper was accepted by Stefan Scholtes, healthcare management.