The Russian Federation is a secular state, and the church is separate from the state. Nonetheless, during Putin’s rule, a seemingly desecularising transition has taken place in Russia. This transition can be observed on legal, ideological, and social levels. This article presents the characteristics of a new secular-state model that has developed in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We claim that the evolution of the public role of religion in Russia and the state’s attitude towards religion cannot be considered in any way a symptom of the post-secularisation tendencies observed in some Western societies. Desecularisation in Russia takes place only at the verbal level. However, this façade desecularisation conceals a profound secularisation of religious institutions and organisations, understood as their total subordination to state policy objectives and, thus, their becoming elements of the state structure.

Background: In 2011, a civil war started in Syria, which is on-going and has reached a death toll of over 400,000 people. Humanitarian organizations, including Aid to The Church in Need (ACN), have strived to provide help and medical support to the civilian victims.Methods: We performed a retrospective analysis of data gathered in ACN projects in Syria in 2019. The datasets included descriptions of diseases, treatments, costs, cities, and hospitals. For each patient, we assigned the following additional categories: type of help (treatment, diagnosis, or nonmedical), type of treatment (medical or surgical), medical specialty, gross anatomic region, and presence of trauma.Results: A total of 3835 patients benefited from ACN support in Syria in 2019. The majority of financial support went towards treatment (78.4%), while other support went towards nonmedical help (15.7%) or providing a diagnosis (5.9%). Among treatments, 66.6% were medical and 33.4% surgical. The most common medical specialty was internal medicine (48.4%), followed by public health (13.7%) and surgery (7.3%). Anatomic region was undefined in 68.3% of cases and, when defined, was most commonly the abdominal cavity and pelvis (13%). The vast majority of cases 95.1%) were not associated with trauma. Procedural costs were highest in the Valley of Christians region, and lowest in Tartous. Network graphs were used to visualize the three most common diagnoses and treatments for each medical specialty.Conclusions: The present report describes the treatment of war victims in Syria in 2019. The patients lacked the most basic medical or surgical healthcare. Charity organizations, like ACN, constitute a valuable source of information about the healthcare of war victims. Unfortunately, the methods of describing medical treatment provided to civilian victims remain underdeveloped. Future studies will require the cooperation of healthcare providers, humanists, and social workers. The present findings can help to optimize the provision of humanitarian help by charity organizations, by tailoring projects to the specific needs of Syrian war victims.

Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, which escalated into full-scale military confrontation in February 2022, originated in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the backing of pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. However, this war extends beyond bilateral hostilities, reflecting a broader geopolitical confrontation with the West that aligns with Vladimir Putin’s strategic vision, as signalled in his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech. Russian security doctrines have consistently framed the West as an existential threat, a perception reinforced by state-controlled media. This study examines the role of Russian state media in shaping public perceptions of the West between 2014 and 2022. It explores how Russian media, particularly RIA Novosti, constructed adversarial narratives about Latvia, Poland, and Serbia within the framework of Russian security policy. Through qualitative content analysis, the research investigates the alignment of media narratives with official strategic objectives, the portrayal of Western nations as threats, and the intended audience of these narratives. The findings underscore the integral role of state-controlled media in Russia’s security strategy, highlighting an increasing consolidation of media control to sustain domestic legitimacy and justify external aggression. As Russia faces growing challenges, media restrictions are expected to intensify, reinforcing state-driven narratives and information isolation.

This article aims to analyze religious and mystical elements contained in Putin’s public statements by referring to selected examples characteristic of contemporary Russian identity politics. In order to demonstrate the importance of religious and mystical threads in Putin’s speeches, we chose five specific cases. The analysis of these statements indicates that religious and mystical motifs in Putin’s language are an attempt at self-creation for the purpose of domestic policy. We claim that this self-creation is more of an effort to strengthen Putin’s public support than proof that he borrows patterns for shaping Russia’s political life from the Russian religious and political tradition. Putin’s rhetoric is not so much a desire for an axiological renewal of Russian politics but an attempt to search for the new legitimization of the power system he created in confrontation with the West.

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) presents itself as a defender of traditional Christian values. Among these values, representatives of the ROC mention concern for marriage and family. To what extent is the position of the ROC an expression of commitment to the traditional Christian concept of marriage and family? In this article, we analyse the contemporary Orthodox discourse in Russia since Kirill Gundyayev became the Patriarch of Moscow in 2009. From a political science and security studies perspective, we highlight the main ideological elements of this discourse. We contrast these elements with similar content in Russian official documents and Vladimir Putin’s statements. An analysis of what the ROC says about the problems and protection of marriage and family in Russia, against the background of Putin’s statements and the actions of the state authorities, shows that the ROC’s discourse on marriage and family echoes the main themes of the political discourse controlled by the state authorities. In its understanding of marriage and in its efforts on behalf of the family, the ROC represents a conservative doctrinal position. Although, in doctrinal terms, it essentially expresses the traditional Christian teaching on marriage, the strong ideologisation and securitisation of demographic issues in Russia are also reflected in church discourse.

The activities for Poland’s national security, including its independence and sovereignty, observed over the last centuries, justify reflection on the relevance of the undertakings of the Polish diaspora communities. Polish organizations operating in many countries, thanks to the cultivation of national identity, were able to contribute to Poland regaining its independence in 1918, support the fight against the Germans and Russians during World War II, and then act for liberation from communism. Therefore, the interest of the state assumes care for the Polish community abroad, both its connection with the country and strengthening its sense of responsibility for the homeland. The article presents the characteristics of Polish organizations in Ireland, where Polish emigration has rapidly increased in recent decades. It is stated that the Polish diaspora communities need systemic support from the Polish state through actions to ensure the integrity of the national identity of the Polish diaspora. In the Polish organisations, it is necessary to recognise the strength to promote Polishness, the concern for Poland’s national interest, but also the diverse potential for dealing with threats to Poland.