Filipe Martins

Mr. Filipe Martins

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 October 2017 in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
EAElvio Accinelli
Elvio Accinelli
FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
JOJorge Oviedo
Jorge Oviedo
Alberto Adrego PintoAlberto Adrego Pinto
Alberto Adrego Pinto
LQLuis Quintas
Luis Quintas
The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.

16 September 2020 in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EAElvio Accinelli
Elvio Accinelli
FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
APAlberto A. Pinto
Alberto A. Pinto
AAAtefeh Afsar
Atefeh Afsar
Bruno M. P. M. OliveiraBruno M. P. M. Oliveira
Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira
We introduce an evolutionary dynamical model for corruption in a democratic state describing the interactions between citizens, government and officials, where the voting power of the citizens is the main mechanism to control corruption. Three main scenarios for the evolution of corruption emerge depending on the efficiency of the institutions and the social, political, and economic characteristics of the State. Efficient institutions can create a corruption intolerant self-reinforcing mechanism. The lack of political choices, weaknesses of institutions and vote buying can create a self-reinforcing mechanism of corruption. The ambition of the rulers can induce high levels of corruption that can be fought by the voting power of the citizens creating corruption cycles.

6 January 2017 in Journal of Mathematical Biology
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Journal Article
Closed access
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JCJ. M. Cushing
J. M. Cushing
FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
Alberto Adrego PintoAlberto Adrego Pinto
Alberto Adrego Pinto
AVAmy Veprauskas
Amy Veprauskas

1 January 2019 in Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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AAAtefeh Afsar
Atefeh Afsar
FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
Bruno M. P. M. OliveiraBruno M. P. M. Oliveira
Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira
Alberto Adrego PintoAlberto Adrego Pinto
Alberto Adrego Pinto
We fit an immune response model to data reporting the CD4+ T cell numbers from the 28 days following the infection of mice with lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus LCMV. We used an ODE model that was previously used to describe qualitatively the behaviour of CD4+ T cells, regulatory T cells (Tregs) and interleukine-2 (IL-2) density. The model considered two clonotypes of T cells in order to fit simultaneously the two time series for the gp61 and NP309 epitopes. We observed the proliferation of T cells and, to a lower extent, Tregs during the immune activation phase following infection and subsequently, during the contraction phase, a smooth transition from faster to slower death rates. The six parameters that were optimized were: the beginning and ending times of the immune response, the growth rate of T cells, their capacity, and the two related with the homeostatic numbers of T cells that respond to each epitope. We showed that the ODE model was able to be calibrated thus providing a quantitative description of the data.

22 December 2022 in Mathematics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
Alberto Adrego PintoAlberto Adrego Pinto
Alberto Adrego Pinto
JZJorge Passamani Zubelli
Jorge Passamani Zubelli
In this work, we consider a classic international trade model with two countries and one firm in each country. The game has two stages: in the first stage, the governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either: (a) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (b) cooperatively (social optimum); in the second stage, firms competitively choose (Nash) their home and export quantities under Cournot-type competition conditions. In a previous publication we compared the competitive tariffs with the cooperative tariffs and we showed that the game is one of the two following types: (i) prisoner’s dilemma (when the competitive welfare outcome is dominated by the cooperative welfare outcome); or (ii) a lose–win dilemma (an asymmetric situation where only one of the countries is damaged in the cooperative welfare outcome, whereas the other is benefited). In both scenarios, their aggregate cooperative welfare is larger than the aggregate competitive welfare. The lack of coincidence of competitive and cooperative tariffs is one of the main difficulties in international trade calling for the establishment of trade agreements. In this work, we propose a welfare-balanced trade agreement where: (i) the countries implement their cooperative tariffs and so increase their aggregate welfare from the competitive to the cooperative outcome; (ii) they redistribute the aggregate cooperative welfare according to their relative competitive welfare shares. We analyse the impact of such trade agreement in the relative shares of relevant economic quantities such as the firm’s profits, consumer surplus, and custom revenue. This analysis allows the countries to add other conditions to the agreement to mitigate the effects of high changes in these relative shares. Finally, we introduce the trade agreement index measuring the gains in the aggregate welfare of the two countries. In general, we observe that when the gains are higher, the relative shares also exhibit higher changes. Hence, higher gains demand additional caution in the construction of the trade agreement to safeguard the interests of the countries.

22 December 2019 in International Game Theory Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
EAElvio Accinelli
Elvio Accinelli
FMFilipe Martins
Filipe Martins
JOJorge Oviedo
Jorge Oviedo