RAN LI

Dr. RAN LI

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 December 2016 in Journal of Contemporary Asia
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
KCKee-Cheok Cheong
Kee-Cheok Cheong
While much research has been undertaken on firms’ internationalisation, much less has been written on internationalisation’s other side, localisation. Yet with the rise of emerging economies, especially Chinese transnational corporations, localisation has become an increasingly significant. This article examines the localisation experience of two Chinese telecommunications enterprises – Huawei and ZTE – in Malaysia. By holding these factors constant (the ceteris paribus assumption), several dimensions of localisation are revealed. They are product, workforce, technology, organisation and management. Firm-specific factors matter both in accounting for inter-firm similarities and differences in the manner they localised. Enterprise ownership is also important in explaining firm performance and host countries’ perception of these firms. Leadership styles of these enterprises’ founders also matter. Together, these factors affect the differential pace of firms’ internationalisation and localisation.

1 April 2016 in Cities
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
QWQianyi Wang
Qianyi Wang
KCKee Cheok Cheong
Kee Cheok Cheong

1 February 2016 in Cities
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
QWQianyi Wang
Qianyi Wang
KCKee Cheok Cheong
Kee Cheok Cheong

23 August 2019 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
QWQianyi WANG
Qianyi WANG
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
KCKee Cheok Cheong
Kee Cheok Cheong
Although much research has been devoted to urbanization and city growth, urban dynamics also include city decay and renewal. Extant theories and models have been developed to explain these dynamics. They do not, however, fit the experience of China’s “ghost cities”. These cities have been characterized as state-built but minimally inhabited, testimony to planning failure by the monolithic Chinese state. The goal of the article is to provide in-depth insights to China’s ghost city phenomenon and its effects to residents from local stakeholders’ perspectives. A review of Shandong’s new Yintan city reveals many ghost city attributes, but its development trajectory was at odds with this stereotype. Yintan’s lack of success was attributable to too little, not too much, state intervention, reflecting limited state capacity to develop and manage the new city by Rushan, the nearby small city seeking to capitalize on the central government’s development imperatives. These distinctive features notwithstanding, generic key drivers of city growth can help explain Yintan’s lack of development, in a sense, reconciling the city’s experience with extant research elsewhere.

5 September 2018 in Strategic Planning for Energy and the Environment
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Sufeng WangSufeng Wang
Sufeng Wang
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
JLJia Liu
Jia Liu
ZPZhanglin PENG
Zhanglin PENG
YBYu Bai
Yu Bai
Industrial efficiency is important for the development of regional economic policies. Based on a network data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology which considered undesirable outputs and links b...

13 February 2019 in Cold War History
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YHYanqing He
Yanqing He
KCKee Cheok Cheong
Kee Cheok Cheong
RLRAN LI
RAN LI
Declassified documents from China and the former Soviet Union on the Malayan ‘Emergency’ reveal not only the Chinese Communist Party’s perspective of and role in the episode, but also that China’s unwillingness to help the Malayan communists was a factor that led the latter to opt for negotiations at Baling. Other contributing factors were the Malayan government’s willingness to negotiate, the Communists’ military difficulties, and the Communist International’s stance of peaceful coexistence. Baling’s failure marked the end of this phase of China’s rapprochement and a reversion to supporting armed struggle until relations thawed again in the early 1970s.