Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) enable the connection and information exchange between vehicles and transportation infrastructure (V2I), vehicle and vehicle (V2V) to improve the safety and efficiency of the transportation system. In previous protocols, V2I and V2V authentication protocols based on bilinear pairings or identity-based cryptography are computationally heavy or difficult to protect the user’s identity and privacy. In addition, lightweight authentication protocols have not achieve both V2I and V2V authentication, and may suffer from Onboard Unit (OBU) intrusion attacks, Roadside Unit (RSU) captured attacks, and difficult to track malicious vehicles. Therefore, a lightweight and anonymous V2I and V2V authentication protocol with batch verification based on Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) is proposed. We use Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) and biological key to avoid RSU captured attacks and OBU intrusion attacks, design a feature embedding strategy with dynamic pseudo-identity to recover the malicious vehicle’s identity by the Trusted Authority (TA). In the application test simulating the actual scenario, our protocol is more efficient because of lower overhead and batch authentication strategy. The semantic security of the protocol is formally proved under the random oracle model. The comparative analysis and security proof results show that our protocol is more superior to others.
26 June 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
As one of the most valuable vehicle-based Internet of Things (IoT) applications, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have received extensive attention since it was proposed. In order to ensure the safety of VANETs and improve the communication efficiency between moving vehicles and different Roadside Units (RSUs), some handover authentication protocols for VANETs have been proposed. However, the existing protocols have some problems such as excessive computation overhead, untraceable malicious messages, and the inability to resist RSU captured attacks. To solve the above problems, we propose a blockchain-based protocol to achieve Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) authentication, V2I handover authentication, and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) broadcasting authentication. The advantages of our protocol are: (1) It achieves lightweight V2I handover authentication and V2V broadcast authentication, dynamic anonymity strategy and embedding strategy of pseudo-identity and vehicle feature are used to guarantee anonymity and traceability simultaneously; (2) The announcement can be broadcasted verifiably without the help of transportation infrastructure (e.g., RSU) or the Trusted Authority (TA); and (3) The Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF) technology is used to resist RSU captured attacks. We use formal security proof under random oracle model to prove the security of the proposed protocol. Compared with related V2I handover authentication protocols, our protocol can resist RSU captured attacks and other various known attacks. The sum of first and handover authentication efficiency of our protocol is 37.93% higher than the previous most effective protocol while maintaining the same level of communication and storage costs.
29 September 2021 in Security and Communication Networks
The Internet of things is playing more and more important role in smart healthcare, smart grids, and smart transportation, and using wireless sensor network (WSN), we can easily obtain and transmit information. However, the data security and users’ privacy are the biggest challenges for WSN because sensor nodes have low computing power and low storage capacity and are easy to be captured, and wireless networks are vulnerable. In 2021, Shuai et al. proposed a lightweight three-factor anonymous authentication scheme for WSN. However, we found that their protocol is vulnerable to stolen-verifier attack, modification of messages’ attack, and no perfect forward secrecy. Then, a new three-factor anonymous authentication scheme using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is proposed. Through informal and formal security analyses, our scheme can resist various known attacks and maintains low computational complexity.
In Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), existing traffic accident handling schemes are adoptable only in the scenario with Roadside Unit (RSU) deployment, and the generation of accident reports relies on RSUs and witness vehicles. Without the confirmation from involved vehicles in the accident, it will probably cause disputes afterward, and RSU captured attacks may also affect authentication of vehicles and correctness of accident reports. To address the above issues, we propose a Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to RSU (V2R) authentication and traffic accident handling protocol, in which accident vehicles are sufficient to generate accident reports, thereby enhancing autonomy of the vehicular communication system and reducing reliance on external infrastructure. Furthermore, for ensuring integrity and traceability of accident reports, we utilize blockchain to keep registration information and jointly signed reports, which realizes efficient and secure mutual authentications in V2V and V2R protocols. Finally, for preserving privacy of vehicles, we integrate Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) and symmetric encryption to design a dynamic pseudo-identity strategy, which still allows the registration center to track malicious vehicles. The formal security proof and comparative analysis validate that our protocol preserves higher security and lower overhead by comparison with related schemes.
With the increasing number of vehicles connected to the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), to accommodate the evolving needs and patterns of new vehicles, passengers, and drivers, traditional single Trusted Authority (TA) authentication model may no longer be suitable for the IoV scenario, it is crucial to develop secure, lightweight, efficient, and cross-TA identity authentication and key agreement algorithms. In 2021, Xu et al. proposed a blockchain-based Roadside Unit (RSU)-assisted authentication and key agreement protocol for IoV. However, we describe that their protocol is vulnerable to identity guessing attacks, vehicle forgery attacks, and lacks of session key security and known session key secrecy, and propose a novel blockchain and elliptic curve cryptography-based cross-TA authentication and key agreement protocol for IoV. Our protocol uses Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) and biometric keys to resist RSU capture attacks and Onboard Unit (OBU) intrusion attacks. Formal security proof and comparative analysis indicate that the proposed protocol can resist various known attacks and maintains lower computational complexity.
In Internet of Things (IoT)-based healthcare, sensor nodes are deployed to detect the patient’s physiological data in a wireless sensor network. In order to prevent unwarranted users from accessing the sensor network to obtain patients’ data, designing lightweight and privacy-preserving authentication protocols plays a crucial role. Many lightweight authentication protocols for IoT-based healthcare have been proposed in recent years, but most of them may suffer from one or more security problems. In particular, few protocols can resist sensor node-captured attacks and achieve n-factor secrecy, which leads to unauthorized personnel being able to access the patient’s physiological data and obtain patients’ privacy. Therefore, a lightweight and privacy-preserving authentication protocol for healthcare based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and physical unclonable function (PUF) is proposed to surmount the above obstacles. We design a dynamic anonymity strategy to achieve users’ anonymity and unlinkability and use PUF to protect information stored in users’ devices and sensor nodes. In addition, higher security features such as three-factor secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, resistance to sensor node-captured attacks, and update asynchronous attacks are guaranteed. The proposed protocol is proven to be secure under the random oracle model and maintains lightweight computing efficiency.