This paper examines the impact of high-standard basic farmland construction on farmers’ income in China using panel data at the provincial level from 2006 to 2021. The study aims to provide insights into the relationship between high-standard basic farmland construction and farmers’ income by employing a difference-in-differences model. The research background of this study is rooted in the importance of agricultural development and rural income improvement in China. As the agricultural sector plays a crucial role in ensuring food security and rural stability, it is essential to explore the effects of high-standard basic farmland construction on farmers’ income. The primary objective of this research is to estimate the impact of high-standard basic farmland construction on farmers’ income and to identify any heterogeneity in this relationship across different regions and income levels. By analyzing the baseline regression results, the study finds a significant positive effect of high-standard basic farmland construction on farmers’ income. To gain a deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying this relationship, the study conducts further analysis on the impact pathways. The findings suggest that high-standard basic farmland construction enhances farmers’ income through improvements in agricultural production conditions, land transfer levels, and the cultivation of new agricultural management entities. Furthermore, the study explores the role of high-standard basic farmland construction in grain-producing and non-grain-producing regions. In grain-producing regions, high-standard basic farmland construction primarily increases farmers’ income from family-operated businesses. Conversely, in non-grain-producing regions, it predominantly boosts farmers’ income from wages and property. Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of the impact of high-standard basic farmland construction on farmers’ income in China. The findings highlight the importance of promoting high-standard basic farmland construction for rural income improvement, with implications for agricultural policies and rural development strategies.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a huge impact on people’s consumption behavior and habits. This paper takes Shanghai, China as a case study and uses a questionnaire survey of urban residents in all districts in Shanghai from April to May in 2022. Herein, we empirically analyze the factors affecting shopping modes for agricultural products, describe how things have changed compared to before the outbreak of the pandemic, and explore the underlying mechanism. This paper can provide a policy reference for how to ensure the safety of people’s food supply in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The results show that urban residents pay more attention to the basic attributes of agricultural products such as the quantity guarantee and health safety, and will adjust their consumption modes for agricultural products according to the needs of families and management. Compared with shopping malls and supermarkets, the quantity and quality assurance of community groups and e-commerce platforms can better meet the consumption situation of agricultural products during the pandemic period. The moderating effect of consumer commodity preference in the positive influence of safety evaluation on the transformation of shopping mode is significant. In general, online e-commerce platforms and community group buying have played a significant role in ensuring the acquisition of supplies needed by people during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it remains to be determined whether the changes in the shopping modes for agricultural products of urban consumers brought by the current COVID-19 pandemic are long term or solidified.

Based on the panel data of the province and municipality in 2010–2021, this paper measures the fishery eco-efficiency by using the SBM-DEA model and empirically analyses how China’s marine ranch construction improves the fishery eco-efficiency by using the double-difference fixed-effect model. The results show that, firstly, China’s marine ranch construction can improve the fishery eco-efficiency. Secondly, China’s marine ranch construction promotes fisheries eco-efficiency by improving the input efficiency of labor, fish species, fishing vessel, fishery technology extension, aquaculture area and by reducing pollutant outputs. Thirdly, the fishery eco-efficiency of the marine ranch construction region has increased annually since 2015, and technological changes, scale efficiency changes and technical efficiency changes can all contribute to the fishery eco-efficiency improvement, and increase in order. Based on the results of the empirical analyses, this paper proposes policy recommendations to improve the fishery eco-efficiency in the conjunction with the construction of marine ranch in China.

In the context of global food security and the pursuit of sustainable agricultural development, fostering synergistic innovation in the seed industry is of strategic importance. However, the collaborative innovation process between seed companies, research institutions, and governments is fraught with challenges due to information asymmetry and bounded rationality within the research and development phase. This paper establishes a multi-agent evolutionary game framework, taking the breeding of salt-tolerant rice as a case study. This study, grounded in the theories of information asymmetry and bounded rationality, constructs a two-party evolutionary game model for the interaction between enterprises and research institutions under market mechanisms. It further extends this model to include government participation, forming a three-party evolutionary game model. The aim is to uncover the evolutionary trends in collaborative behavior under various policy interventions and to understand how governments can foster collaborative innovation in salt-tolerant rice breeding through policy measures. To integrate the impact of historical decisions on the evolution of collaborative innovation, this research employs a delay differential equation (DDE) algorithm that takes historical lags into account within the numerical simulation. The stability analysis and numerical simulation using the DDE algorithm reveal the risk of market failure within the collaborative innovation system for salt-tolerant rice breeding operating under market mechanisms. Government involvement can mitigate this risk by adjusting incentive and restraint mechanisms to promote the system’s stability and efficiency. Simulation results further identify that the initial willingness to participate, the coefficient for the distribution of benefits, the coefficient for cost sharing, and the government’s punitive and incentivizing intensities are crucial factors affecting the stability of collaborative innovation. Based on these findings, the study suggests a series of policy recommendations including enhancing the initial motivation for participation in collaborative innovation, refining mechanisms for benefit distribution and cost sharing, strengthening regulatory compliance systems, constructing incentive frameworks, and encouraging information sharing and technology exchange. These strategies aim to establish a healthy and effective ecosystem for collaborative innovation in salt-tolerant rice breeding. While this research uses salt-tolerant rice breeding as a case study, the proposed cooperative mechanisms and policy suggestions have universal applicability in various agricultural science and technology innovation scenarios, especially when research meets widespread social needs but lacks commercial profit drivers, underscoring the essential role of government incentives and support. Consequently, this research not only contributes a new perspective to the application of evolutionary game theory in agricultural science and technology innovation but also offers empirical backing for policymakers in advancing similar collaborative innovation endeavors.

Amid global climate change and population growth, the prevalence of saline–alkali lands significantly hampers sustainable agricultural development. This study employs theories of asymmetric information and bounded rationality to construct an evolutionary game model, analyzing the interactions among small farmers, family farms, and seed industry enterprises in the context of saline–alkali land management. It investigates the strategic choices and dynamics of these stakeholders under the influence of economic incentives and risk perceptions, with a focus on how government policies can foster green development. Utilizing Delay Differential Equations (DDEs) for simulations, this study highlights the risk of “market failure” without government intervention and underscores the need for government participation to stabilize and improve the efficiency of the green development process. The findings reveal that factors such as initial willingness to participate, the economic viability of salt-tolerant crops, seed pricing, research and development costs, and the design of incentive policies are crucial for sustainable land use. Accordingly, the paper proposes specific policy measures to enhance green development, including strengthening information dissemination and technical training, increasing the economic attractiveness of salt-tolerant crops, alleviating research and development pressures on seed companies, and optimizing economic incentives. This study provides a theoretical and policy framework for the sustainable management of saline–alkali lands, offering insights into the behavioral choices of agricultural stakeholders and supporting government strategies for agricultural and environmental protection.

Seeds, as the initial products in agricultural systems, play a pivotal role in ensuring quality, fundamental to national food security and sustainable agricultural development. This study introduces a concept integrating public governance and evolutionary game theory to construct a quadripartite evolutionary game model involving seed companies, certification agencies, farmers, and governmental departments. It considers the strategic choices of these stakeholders under varying economic motivations and market mechanisms, as well as the influence of external regulation and incentives on game strategies. The existence conditions for evolutionarily stable strategy combinations are determined using the Lyapunov first method, and MATLAB is employed for numerical simulation analysis to validate the game analysis under initial conditions. The simulation results reveal two potential equilibrium points corresponding to different strategic choices among stakeholders. The study finds that producing high-quality seeds and the refusal of certification agencies to engage in rent-seeking are crucial for ensuring seed quality. Additionally, the cost–benefit ratio of seed companies, the speculative cost of certification agencies, and the rights-protection cost of farmers are key determinants in the evolution of seed quality assurance strategies. This research also holds practical significance in enhancing seed quality assurance mechanisms and fostering sustainable development in agriculture.