Bo Fu Zhang

Dr. Bo Fu Zhang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 February 2024 in International Journal of Finance & Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YBYunxia Bai
Yunxia Bai
BZBo Fu Zhang
Bo Fu Zhang

19 October 2022 in Frontiers in Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YBYunxia Bai
Yunxia Bai
BZBo Fu Zhang
Bo Fu Zhang
We examine the relationship between social insurance contributions and earnings management for publicly listed firms in China. Our empirical results show that the social insurance contributions burden significantly reduces the degree of earnings management by reducing the level of free cash flow. Additionally, the negative relation between social insurance contributions burden and earnings management is more pronounced when the internal and external social insurance pressures are high and when the firms are large non-state-owned enterprises. We also discuss the heterogeneity among firms for different financing constraints, external financing environment, regional marketization, and internal and external corporate governance. Finally, we further find that under the dual collecting system, although the social security administration is a better collecting agency, the local tax bureau acting with full responsibility is more effective than the collecting system.

21 July 2022 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
YWYewei Wu
Yewei Wu
BZBo Fu Zhang
Bo Fu Zhang
Based on the special stock exchange comment letter system in China, this paper explores the relationship between the exchange tax-related comment letters and corporate tax avoidance behavior from the standpoint of securities regulation. We document that firms that engage in more aggressive tax avoidance are more likely to receive a tax-related exchange comment letter. Also, relative to firms receiving a non-tax-related comment letter, firms receiving a tax-related comment letter reduce their tax avoidance behaviors in subsequent years. Further study shows that the more the number of questions and the greater the level of detail in the comment letter, the stronger the effect of tax-related comment letters on corporate tax avoidance. After examining the sample with different degrees of political connection, we find that tax-related comment letters inhibit tax avoidance among state-owned enterprises and private enterprises with close political connections. Finally, the monitoring effect of comment letters on corporate tax avoidance is more pronounced in regions where tax administration is weak, suggesting that the comment letter system can be used as a complementary mechanism for tax administration.