This study explores the effect of CEO regulatory focus (i.e., promotion vs. prevention) on corporate social performance (CSP). Given that corporate social activities are an outcome-uncertain risky investment, we propose that CEOs with promotion focus (vs. prevention focus) would actively seek CSP, since promotion focus involves risk-taking propensity and prevention focus involves risk-avoiding behavior. We further propose that such a tendency should be more pronounced, especially when market conditions are uncertain. Using a panel sample of U.S. listed firms and conducting content analysis of CEO letters in annual reports, we found that only promotion-focused CEOs tend to promote CSP, and such a tendency is more salient in tough market conditions where firms face a lower level of munificence and a higher level of stakeholder expectation in the markets. We conclude that promotion-focused CEOs tend to seek hope even when situations are hopeless.
This study investigates the effects of discretionary slack resources on a firm’s R&D investment. Specifically, we examine whether and how a CEO’s psychological traits play a role in the relationship between discretionary slack and R&D investment. Using a panel sample from U.S. manufacturing firms in 2006–2010, we found that slack resources lead to an increase in R&D intensity. Furthermore, this positive effect is stronger when CEOs have a strong promotion focus and perceive an addressable negative attainment discrepancy. Thus, our findings show how (a) the level of discretionary slack and (b) CEOs’ promotion focus and aspiration level jointly shape R&D investment decisions. Considering CEOs’ psychological traits contributes to a more comprehensive view of the conditions under which discretionary slack resources matter for a firm’s strategic decisions.