Matthew Boeding

Dr. Matthew Boeding

Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Alabama, USA
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 February 2024 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PSPaul Scalise
Paul Scalise
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
JDJoseph Delloiacovo
Joseph Delloiacovo
JRJohn Reed
John Reed
With the rapid rollout and growing adoption of 3GPP 5thGeneration (5G) cellular services, including in critical infrastructure sectors, it is important to review security mechanisms, risks, and potential vulnerabilities within this vital technology. Numerous security capabilities need to work together to ensure and maintain a sufficiently secure 5G environment that places user privacy and security at the forefront. Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all pillars of a privacy and security framework that define major aspects of 5G operations. They are incorporated and considered in the design of the 5G standard by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) with the goal of providing a highly reliable network operation for all. Through a comprehensive review, we aim to analyze the ever-evolving landscape of 5G, including any potential attack vectors and proposed measures to mitigate or prevent these threats. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the state-of-the-art research that has been conducted in recent years regarding 5G systems, focusing on the main components in a systematic approach: the Core Network (CN), Radio Access Network (RAN), and User Equipment (UE). Additionally, we investigate the utilization of 5G in time-dependent, ultra-confidential, and private communications built around a Zero Trust approach. In today’s world, where everything is more connected than ever, Zero Trust policies and architectures can be highly valuable in operations containing sensitive data. Realizing a Zero Trust Architecture entails continuous verification of all devices, users, and requests, regardless of their location within the network, and grants permission only to authorized entities. Finally, developments and proposed methods of new 5G and future 6G security approaches, such as Blockchain technology, post-quantum cryptography (PQC), and Artificial Intelligence (AI) schemes, are also discussed to understand better the full landscape of current and future research within this telecommunications domain.

30 October 2024 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PSPaul Scalise
Paul Scalise
RGRobert Garcia
Robert Garcia
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
Fifth Generation (5G) cellular networks have been adopted worldwide since the rollout began around 2019. It brought with it many innovations and new services, such as Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Ultra Reliable and Low-Latency Communications (URLLC), and Massive Internet of Things (mIoT). Furthermore, 5G introduced a more scalable approach to network operations using fully software-based Virtualized Network Functions (VNF) in Core Networks (CN) rather than the prior hardware-based approach. However, while this shift towards a fully software-based system design provides numerous significant benefits, such as increased interoperability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness, it also brings with it an increased cybersecurity risk. Security is crucial to maintaining trust between vendors, operators, and consumers. Cyberattacks are rapidly increasing in number and sophistication, and we are seeing a shift towards zero-trust approaches. This means that even communications between VNFs inside a 5G core must be scrutinized and hardened against attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), over the past 10 years, has led efforts to standardize post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to protect against quantum attacks. This paper covers a custom implementation of the open-source free5GC CN, to expand its HTTPS capabilities for VNFs by introducing PQC Key Encapsulation Methods (KEM) for Transport Layer Security (TLS) v1.3. This paper provides the details of this integration with a focus on the latency of different PQC KEMs in initial handshakes between VNFs, on packet size, and the implications in a 5G environment. This work also conducts a security comparison between the PQC-equipped free5GC and other open-source 5G CNs. The presented results indicate a negligible increase in UE connection setup duration and a small increase in connection setup data requirements, strongly indicating that PQC KEM’s benefits far outweigh any downsides when integrated into 5G and 6G core services. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work incorporating PQC into an open-source 5G core. Furthermore, the results from this effort demonstrate that employing PQC ciphers for securing VNF communications results in only a negligible impact on latency and bandwidth usage, thus demonstrating significant benefits to 5G cybersecurity.

19 November 2022 in Energies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
KBKelly Boswell
Kelly Boswell
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
JJJuan Lopez Jr
Juan Lopez Jr
Kalyan PerumallaKalyan Perumalla
Kalyan Perumalla
The convergence of Information Technologies and Operational Technology systems in industrial networks presents many challenges related to availability, integrity, and confidentiality. In this paper, we evaluate the various cybersecurity risks in industrial control systems and how they may affect these areas of concern, with a particular focus on energy-sector Operational Technology systems. There are multiple threats and countermeasures that Operational Technology and Information Technology systems share. Since Information Technology cybersecurity is a relatively mature field, this paper emphasizes on threats with particular applicability to Operational Technology and their respective countermeasures. We identify regulations, standards, frameworks and typical system architectures associated with this domain. We review relevant challenges, threats, and countermeasures, as well as critical differences in priorities between Information and Operational Technology cybersecurity efforts and implications. These results are then examined against the recommended National Institute of Standards and Technology framework for gap analysis to provide a complete approach to energy sector cybersecurity. We provide analysis of countermeasure implementation to align with the continuous functions recommended for a sound cybersecurity framework.

11 January 2024 in Energies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
PSPaul Scalise
Paul Scalise
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
JJJuan Lopez Jr
Juan Lopez Jr
Fifth-generation networks promise wide availability of wireless communication with inherent security features. The 5G standards also outline access for different applications requiring low latency, machine-to-machine communication, or mobile broadband. These networks can be advantageous to numerous applications that require widespread and diverse communications. One such application is found in smart grids. Smart grid networks, and Operational Technology (OT) networks in general, utilize a variety of communication protocols for low-latency control, data monitoring, and reporting at every level. Transitioning these network communications from wired Wide Area Networks (WANs) to wireless communication through 5G can provide additional benefits to their security and network configurability. However, introducing these wireless capabilities may also result in a degradation of network latency. In this paper, we propose utilizing 5G for smart grid communications, and we evaluate the latency impacts of encapsulating GOOSE, Modbus, and DNP3 for transmission over a 5G network. The OpenAirInterface open-source library is utilized to deploy an in-lab 5G Core Network and gNB for testing with off-the-shelf User Equipment (UE). This creates an effective 5G test platform for experimenting with different OT protocols such as GOOSE. The results are validated by measuring two different Intelligent Electronic Devices’ contact closure times for each network configuration. These tests are also conducted for varying packet sizes in order to isolate different sources of network latency. Our study outlines the latency impact of communication over 5G for time-critical and non-critical applications regarding their transition toward private 5G-based OT network implementations. The conducted experiments illustrate that in the case of GOOSE packets, simple encapsulation may exceed the protocol’s time-critical nature, and, therefore, additional measures must be taken to ensure a viable transition of GOOSE to 5G services. However, non-critical applications are shown to be viable for migration to 5G.

4 December 2024 in Future Internet
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
NBNick Bray
Nick Bray
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
Tapio HeikkiläTapio Heikkilä
Tapio Heikkilä
TSTuomas Seppälä
Tuomas Seppälä
Telerobotics involves the operation of robots from a distance, often using advanced communication technologies combining wireless and wired technologies and a variety of protocols. This application domain is crucial because it allows humans to interact with and control robotic systems safely and from a distance, often performing activities in hazardous or inaccessible environments. Thus, by enabling remote operations, telerobotics not only enhances safety but also expands the possibilities for medical and industrial applications. In some use cases, telerobotics bridges the gap between human skill and robotic precision, making the completion of complex tasks requiring high accuracy possible without being physically present. With the growing availability of high-speed networks around the world, especially with the advent of 5G cellular technologies, applications of telerobotics can now span a gamut of scenarios ranging from remote control in the same room to robotic control across the globe. However, there are a variety of factors that can impact the control precision of the robotic platform and user experience of the teleoperator. One such critical factor is latency, especially across large geographical areas or complex network topologies. Consequently, military telerobotics and remote operations, for example, rely on dedicated communications infrastructure for such tasks. However, this creates a barrier to entry for many other applications and domains, as the cost of dedicated infrastructure would be prohibitive. In this paper, we examine the network latency of robotic control over shared network resources in a variety of network settings, such as a local network, access-controlled networks through Wi-Fi and cellular, and a remote transatlantic connection between Finland and the United States. The aim of this study is to quantify and evaluate the constituent latency components that comprise the control feedback loop of this telerobotics experience—of a camera feed for an operator to observe the telerobotic platform’s environment in one direction and the control communications from the operator to the robot in the reverse direction. The results show stable average round-trip latency of 6.6 ms for local network connection, 58.4 ms when connecting over Wi-Fi, 115.4 ms when connecting through cellular, and 240.7 ms when connecting from Finland to the United States over a VPN access-controlled network. These findings provide a better understanding of the capabilities and performance limitations of conducting telerobotics activities over commodity networks, and lay the foundation of our future work to use these insights for optimizing the overall user experience and the responsiveness of this control loop.

21 June 2023 in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MBMatthew Boeding
Matthew Boeding
MHMichael Hempel
Michael Hempel
Hamid SharifHamid Sharif
Hamid Sharif
JLJuan Lopez
Juan Lopez
KPKalyan Perumalla
Kalyan Perumalla