Petr Socha

Mr. Petr Socha

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 October 2022 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
VMVojtěch Miškovský
Vojtěch Miškovský
MNMartin Novotný
Martin Novotný
Side-channel analysis has become a widely recognized threat to the security of cryptographic implementations. Different side-channel attacks, as well as countermeasures, have been proposed in the literature. Such attacks pose a severe threat to both hardware and software cryptographic implementations, especially in the IoT environment where the attacker may easily gain physical access to a device, leaving it vulnerable to tampering. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey regarding the non-invasive passive side-channel analysis. We describe both non-profiled and profiled attacks, related security metrics, countermeasures against such attacks, and leakage-assessment methodologies, as available in the literature of more than twenty years of research.

1 April 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
VMVojtech Miskovsky
Vojtech Miskovsky
HKHana Kubatova
Hana Kubatova
MNMartin Novotný
Martin Novotný
Differential power analysis (DPA) is one of the most common side channel attacks. To perform this attack we need to calculate a large amount of correlation coefficients. This amount is even higher when attacking FPGAs or ASICs, for higher order attacks and especially for attacking DPA protected devices. This article explains different approaches to the calculation of correlations, describes our implementation of these approaches and presents a detailed comparison considering their performance and their properties for a practical usage.

1 June 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
JBJan Brejnik
Jan Brejnik
MBMatej Bartik
Matej Bartik
Differential power analysis (DPA) and its enhanced variant, correlation power analysis (CPA), are one of the most common side channel attacks today. A dedicated hardware platform is often used when performing this kind of attack for experimental purposes. In this paper, we present the modifications of a common ZYBO board, that are necessary to perform the CPA attack. We illustrate the whole process of attacking both software and hardware implementations of AES-128 and we present our experimental results.

1 October 2020 in Microprocessors and Microsystems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
JBJan Brejník
Jan Brejník
JBJosep Balasch
Josep Balasch
MNMartin Novotný
Martin Novotný
NMNele Mentens
Nele Mentens

1 September 2021 in Microprocessors and Microsystems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
VMVojtěch Miškovský
Vojtěch Miškovský
MNMartin Novotný
Martin Novotný

1 August 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
PSPetr Socha
Petr Socha
VMVojtech Miskovsky
Vojtech Miskovsky
HKHana Kubatova
Hana Kubatova
MNMartin Novotný
Martin Novotný
Correlation power analysis (CPA) is one of the most common side channel attacks today, posing a threat to many modern ciphers, including AES. The simplest method to extract the correct key guess is selecting the guess with the maximum Pearson correlation coefficient. We propose another distinguisher based on a significant change in the correlation trace rather than on the absolute value of the coefficient. Our approach performs better than the standard CPA, especially in the noisy environment.