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Regulators have increasingly started to focus on safety culture. The causal link between regulatory initiatives to improve safety culture and a potential decline in accidents may, however, appear like a “black box”, involving social processes that seem hard to foresee and influence. We need a better conceptual understanding of this. The aims of our study are to: 1) Map studies of regulatory efforts to influence safety culture in companies, 2) Use the identified studies to develop a conceptual model of the analytical relationships between regulatory initiatives to improve safety culture and accidents in these studies, including the factors influencing these analytical relationships and 3) discuss practical implications. The review is reported according to PRISMA-guidelines, and focuses on professional transport (aviation, sea, rail, road) and the Norwegian petroleum sector. Our review indicates at least six analytical relationships, mediating between regulatory attempts to influence organizational safety culture and accidents. These are between: 1) Rules and regulators, 2) Regulators and companies, 3) Managers and employees in the companies, 4) Organizational members’ shared ways of thinking and acting, which are the two key elements of safety culture, 5) Safety culture and safety behaviour, and between 6) Safety behaviour and accidents. Regulatory attempts to influence safety culture may fail or succeed at each level, through factors involved in the different relationships.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Rune Elvik. How can regulatory authorities improve safety in organizations by influencing safety culture? A conceptual model of the relationships and a discussion of implications. Accident Analysis & Prevention 2021, 159, 106228 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll, Rune Elvik. How can regulatory authorities improve safety in organizations by influencing safety culture? A conceptual model of the relationships and a discussion of implications. Accident Analysis & Prevention. 2021; 159 ():106228.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Rune Elvik. 2021. "How can regulatory authorities improve safety in organizations by influencing safety culture? A conceptual model of the relationships and a discussion of implications." Accident Analysis & Prevention 159, no. : 106228.
About 36% of fatal road accidents in Norway involve at least one driver who is “at work”. It has been argued that the implementation of rules clearly defining the responsibility of road transport companies to prevent work related accidents, by implementing safety management systems (SMS), could lead to increased safety. In the present study we tested the validity of this suggestion, by examining the influence of different sector rules on work-related accident prevention in Norwegian road and maritime transport. In contrast to the road sector, the maritime sector has had rules requiring SMS for over 20 years, clearly defining the shipping companies responsibility for prevention of work-related accidents. The aims of the study were to: (1) examine how the different sector rules influence perceptions of whether the responsibility to prevent work-related accidents is clearly defined in each sector; and (2) compare respondents’ perceptions of the quality of their sectors’ efforts to prevent work-related accidents, and factors influencing this. The study was based on a small-scale survey (N = 112) and qualitative interviews with sector experts (N = 17) from companies, authorities, and NGOs in the road and the maritime sectors. Results indicate that respondents in the maritime sector perceive the responsibility to prevent work-related accidents as far more clearly defined, and they rate their sector’s efforts to prevent accidents as higher than respondents in road. Multivariate analyses indicate that this is related to the scope of safety regulations in the sectors studied, controlled for several important framework conditions. Based on the results, we conclude that the implementation of SMS rules focused on transport companies’ responsibility to prevent work-related accidents could improve safety in the road sector. However, due to barriers to SMS implementation in the road sector, we suggest starting with a simplified version of SMS.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Beate Elvebakk; Karen Ranestad. Work-Related Accident Prevention in Norwegian Road and Maritime Transport: Examining the Influence of Different Sector Rules. Infrastructures 2021, 6, 72 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Beate Elvebakk, Karen Ranestad. Work-Related Accident Prevention in Norwegian Road and Maritime Transport: Examining the Influence of Different Sector Rules. Infrastructures. 2021; 6 (5):72.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Beate Elvebakk; Karen Ranestad. 2021. "Work-Related Accident Prevention in Norwegian Road and Maritime Transport: Examining the Influence of Different Sector Rules." Infrastructures 6, no. 5: 72.
Light inland helicopter has for several years been the most accident-prone sector within commercial aviation, with a more than 10 times higher accident risk than offshore helicopters. The main aims of this article are to: 1) Examine why accidents with light inland helicopters occur, focusing especially on the situation in Norway, but also internationally and 2) discuss how these accidents can be prevented. These questions are examined based on three data sources: 1) Analysis of reports from the Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN), 2) Qualitative expert interviews, and 3) Systematic literature review. Most of the reviewed studies point to combinations of human errors and technical failures as the major risk factors contributing to helicopter accidents. Our analysis contributes to existing research by also indicating the critical importance of work-related factors like inadequate safety management systems, poor safety culture and challenging framework conditions for pilot behaviour and safety. The literature review indicates a lack of robustly evaluated helicopter safety interventions to address the identified risk factors. Our analysis of the AIBN reports and the interviews indicates a need for measures aiming to improve the safety culture in a sector with challenging framework conditions. Measures focusing on the development of self-imposed and commonly accepted operational limits and guidelines in the sector are discussed.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Rolf Johan Bye; Stian Antonsen; Siri H. Berge; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Beate Elvebakk. Examining the most accident-prone sector within commercial aviation: Why do accidents with light inland helicopters occur, and how can we improve safety? Safety Science 2021, 139, 105235 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Rolf Johan Bye, Stian Antonsen, Siri H. Berge, Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll, Beate Elvebakk. Examining the most accident-prone sector within commercial aviation: Why do accidents with light inland helicopters occur, and how can we improve safety? Safety Science. 2021; 139 ():105235.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Rolf Johan Bye; Stian Antonsen; Siri H. Berge; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Beate Elvebakk. 2021. "Examining the most accident-prone sector within commercial aviation: Why do accidents with light inland helicopters occur, and how can we improve safety?" Safety Science 139, no. : 105235.
There seems to be a widespread view that foreign lorry drivers’ lack of competence on Norwegian roads, especially related to winter driving, is a significant safety problem. It has, however, been suggested that foreign heavy goods vehicle (HGV) drivers perform better than expected on Norwegian winter roads, as they feel less safe than Norwegian drivers, and adapt by driving slower and more carefully. The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we examine whether foreign HGV drivers in Norway actually have poorer competence on, training for, experience with and equipment for winter driving than Norwegian HGV drivers. Second, we discuss whether the expected negative effect of these safety challenges is mitigated, as foreign HGV drivers adapt their behaviours. We use four data sources to shed light on the aims: (1) interviews, (2) roadside inspections, (3) small-scale survey and (4) towing incidents. Our data support the hypothesis about behavioural adaptation, indicating that foreign HGV drivers experience winter driving as more difficult or unsafe, as they have supposedly less suitable vehicles and equipment, less experience, training and competence for winter driving. They are therefore more likely to get stuck while driving uphill on winter roads, supposedly as they drive more carefully and slower than Norwegian HGV drivers. Norwegian HGV drivers feel safer and more confident while driving on winter roads, because of their equipment and their experience.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Fridulv Sagberg; Gunhild Levlin; Torkel Bjørnskau. Competence, equipment and behavioural adaptation on Norwegian winter roads: A comparison of foreign and Norwegian HGV drivers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 2021, 77, 257 -273.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Fridulv Sagberg, Gunhild Levlin, Torkel Bjørnskau. Competence, equipment and behavioural adaptation on Norwegian winter roads: A comparison of foreign and Norwegian HGV drivers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. 2021; 77 ():257-273.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Fridulv Sagberg; Gunhild Levlin; Torkel Bjørnskau. 2021. "Competence, equipment and behavioural adaptation on Norwegian winter roads: A comparison of foreign and Norwegian HGV drivers." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 77, no. : 257-273.
The Safety ladder for goods transport describes an approach with an increasing prevalence of safety structural measures at four Safety ladder levels in trucking companies. This paper validates the Safety ladder approach in empirical research by comparing safety structure, safety culture and accident risk for trucking companies. The study has four aims: 1) To map the safety structure at the different levels of the Safety ladder, 2) Examine whether safety culture is improved with increased structural measures at each Safety ladder level, 3) Examine whether the accident risk decreases at each Safety ladder level, and 4) Discuss practical implications. The study is based on survey data (N = 533) from 17 companies at different levels of the Safety ladder, a Reference sample, and qualitative interviews (N = 30) with management and employee representatives in the companies. Based on the interviews, we describe the safety structural measures at each level of the Safety ladder. Survey results indicate increasing safety culture scores at each level of the Safety ladder, while the accident risk decreases. The safety culture level was 12 points higher at Level 4, than in the Reference sample, and the accident risk at Level 4 was half the risk of Level 2. We conclude by suggesting the concrete management practices related to each level. Thus, the current study identifies and describes management practices in trucking companies that are associated with high safety culture scores and low accident risk.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Jenny Blom; Ross O. Phillips. Safety culture, safety management and accident risk in trucking companies. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 2020, 73, 325 -347.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Jenny Blom, Ross O. Phillips. Safety culture, safety management and accident risk in trucking companies. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. 2020; 73 ():325-347.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Jenny Blom; Ross O. Phillips. 2020. "Safety culture, safety management and accident risk in trucking companies." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 73, no. : 325-347.
The mandatory periodic training for professional drivers is in many ways a success. Considerable numbers of students report that they have acquired new knowledge and changed their driving practices. Courses for drivers in passenger transport and a well-organised course, were strongly associated with learning outcomes and self-reported behavioural changes. One of the main conclusions, the importance of management support, has strong backing in the literature on organizational training effectiveness. This should be given more attention in future research.
Beate Elvebakk; Tor-Olav Nævestad; Leif Christian Lahn. Mandatory periodic training for professional drivers: A Norwegian study of implementation and effects. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 2020, 72, 264 -279.
AMA StyleBeate Elvebakk, Tor-Olav Nævestad, Leif Christian Lahn. Mandatory periodic training for professional drivers: A Norwegian study of implementation and effects. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. 2020; 72 ():264-279.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBeate Elvebakk; Tor-Olav Nævestad; Leif Christian Lahn. 2020. "Mandatory periodic training for professional drivers: A Norwegian study of implementation and effects." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 72, no. : 264-279.
The aims of the present paper are to: (1) Examine the influence of national safety culture, sector safety focus and organizational safety culture on the safety behaviours of professional drivers, compared with other explanatory variables (e.g. age, type of transport, working conditions), and to (2) Examine the influence of safety behaviours and other factors (e.g. age, mileage, type of transport) on self-reported crash involvement. A survey was conducted, including 215 bus drivers in Norway and Greece. Our study provides four main results. First, more bus drivers in Greece than in Norway report being involved in more aggressive violations in traffic (e.g. become angered by other drivers and indicate hostility, sound their horn). Second, aggressive violations were predicted by national road safety culture, specified as descriptive norms (“violations”) and values/attitudes (individual freedom to take risk in traffic). Third, Greek bus drivers' aggressive violations in traffic predicted their self-reported crash involvement, although reports on “work related variables” (e.g. experienced work pressure) were more strongly correlated with their crash involvement than their self-reported aggressive violations. Fourth, organizational safety culture contributed negatively to aggressive road safety behaviours, meaning that a positive organizational safety culture may reduce (the negative impact of national road safety culture on) aggressive violations in traffic. Although more research is needed, our study indicates a relationship between national road safety culture, road safety behaviour and crash involvement, that could be developed further to help explain differences in national road safety records.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Alexandra Laiou; Torkel Bjørnskau; George Yannis. Safety culture among bus drivers in Norway and Greece. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 2019, 64, 323 -341.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Ross O. Phillips, Alexandra Laiou, Torkel Bjørnskau, George Yannis. Safety culture among bus drivers in Norway and Greece. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour. 2019; 64 ():323-341.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Alexandra Laiou; Torkel Bjørnskau; George Yannis. 2019. "Safety culture among bus drivers in Norway and Greece." Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour 64, no. : 323-341.
The relationship between safety culture and safety outcomes is well documented across industries and countries, and regulators in different industries have increasingly included safety culture in their repertory. Safety culture is, however, a fairly new regulatory concept, and it seems that knowledge is lacking on pros and cons and expected outcomes of strategies that regulatory authorities can use to improve safety culture. The aims of our study are therefore to: (1) Map descriptions of regulatory efforts to influence safety culture in companies; (2) Identify strategies employed by regulatory authorities to influence safety culture; (3) Describe (regulators’ and companies’) experiences with, and results of the strategies; (4) Discuss pros and cons of the strategies (possibilities and challenges). The paper also provides a more general discussion of whether it is possible to regulate safety culture, and subsequently what it means to regulate safety culture. The paper is based on experiences from three sectors that have introduced safety culture in their regulatory repertory: (1) The Norwegian petroleum industry, (2) North American rail, and (3) The nuclear industry. The experiences are studied in a systematic literature review reported according to PRISMA guidelines. Our discussion indicates that to include safety culture in the regulatory repertory may involve a range of different strategies, e.g. auditing safety culture, introducing new rules, providing information, providing assistance with self-measurements etc. The study identifies and discusses 5 rule-based and 6 advisory-based strategies that regulators may utilize when attempting to influence organizational safety culture.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Karen Ranestad; Stian Antonsen. Strategies regulatory authorities can use to influence safety culture in organizations: Lessons based on experiences from three sectors. Safety Science 2019, 118, 409 -423.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll, Karen Ranestad, Stian Antonsen. Strategies regulatory authorities can use to influence safety culture in organizations: Lessons based on experiences from three sectors. Safety Science. 2019; 118 ():409-423.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Ingeborg Storesund Hesjevoll; Karen Ranestad; Stian Antonsen. 2019. "Strategies regulatory authorities can use to influence safety culture in organizations: Lessons based on experiences from three sectors." Safety Science 118, no. : 409-423.
While Norway had the lowest road mortality rate in Europe in 2017, Greece had one of the worst road safety records of all EU-27 countries. The present study investigates road safety culture (RSC) as an explanation for this discrepancy by: (1) Comparing the road safety behaviours among professional and private drivers in Norway and Greece, (2) Examining factors influencing road safety behaviours, focusing especially on national road safety culture, and (3) Examining the influence of road safety behaviours and other factors (e.g., demographic and work-related variables) on accident involvement. This is done by comparing survey answers of private car (N = 796) and professional drivers (heavy goods vehicles and buses) in Norway and Greece (N = 416). Results from qualitative interviews (N = 61) are also presented. We study safety behaviours hypothesized to vary according to nationality (e.g., aggressive violations), and behaviours hypothesized to vary according to the professional versus private driver dimension (e.g., seat belt use). A central objective is to examine whether the former safety behaviours are more similar among private and professional drivers within countries than among professional and private drivers across national samples, indicating common national road safety cultures among private and professional drivers in the respective countries. The results indicate that aggressive violations are more similar among private and professional drivers within the national samples, than across the national samples, while seat belt use seems to vary according to the professional versus private dimension. The results also indicate a relationship between aggressive violations and accident involvement, although other variables were more strongly correlated. Moreover, drivers’ safety behaviours were influenced by the behaviours that these groups ascribed to other drivers in their countries, indicating the existence of different national road safety cultures. The Greek RSC was characterized by more aggression and violations than the Norwegian RSC, which seemed to be characterized by a higher level of compliance and politeness. The different RSCs may perhaps shed light on the different accident records in the two countries.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Alexandra Laiou; Ross O. Phillips; Torkel Bjørnskau; George Yannis. Safety Culture among Private and Professional Drivers in Norway and Greece: Examining the Influence of National Road Safety Culture. Safety 2019, 5, 20 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Alexandra Laiou, Ross O. Phillips, Torkel Bjørnskau, George Yannis. Safety Culture among Private and Professional Drivers in Norway and Greece: Examining the Influence of National Road Safety Culture. Safety. 2019; 5 (2):20.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Alexandra Laiou; Ross O. Phillips; Torkel Bjørnskau; George Yannis. 2019. "Safety Culture among Private and Professional Drivers in Norway and Greece: Examining the Influence of National Road Safety Culture." Safety 5, no. 2: 20.
The study compares crew members on Norwegian cargo vessels (N = 93) and passenger vessels (N = 76) with crew members on Greek cargo vessels (N = 99) and Greek passenger vessels (N = 99). The aims are to: 1) Examine the influence of national safety culture, sector safety focus and organizational safety culture on safety behaviours, compared with other explanatory variables (e.g. age, position, vessel type, working conditions) and to 2) Examine the influence of safety behaviours and other factors on occupational injuries. The paper focuses on the following unsafe behaviours: 1) Risk acceptance/violations, 2) Working under the influence of alcohol, or while being hungover and 3) Non-intervention/non-reporting. Organizational factors like demanding working conditions and organizational safety culture are the most important predictors of Risk acceptance/violations and Non-intervention/non-reporting. National safety culture is the most important predictor of respondents’ tendency to work under the influence of alcohol/hungover. Respondents’ occupational injuries are influenced by Risk acceptance/violations, nationality and age. The study indicates that safety culture at different analytical levels, influence different types of unsafe behaviours, which in turn influence the risk of work injuries. Thus, it is suggested that it is important to study safety culture at different analytical levels (i.e. the national, sectorial and organizational), to fully understand the influence of culture on safety in transport.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Kristine Vedal Størkersen; Alexandra Laiou; George Yannis. Safety culture in maritime transport in Norway and Greece: Exploring national, sectorial and organizational influences on unsafe behaviours and work accidents. Marine Policy 2018, 99, 1 -13.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Ross O. Phillips, Kristine Vedal Størkersen, Alexandra Laiou, George Yannis. Safety culture in maritime transport in Norway and Greece: Exploring national, sectorial and organizational influences on unsafe behaviours and work accidents. Marine Policy. 2018; 99 ():1-13.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Kristine Vedal Størkersen; Alexandra Laiou; George Yannis. 2018. "Safety culture in maritime transport in Norway and Greece: Exploring national, sectorial and organizational influences on unsafe behaviours and work accidents." Marine Policy 99, no. : 1-13.
Previous studies from the coastal cargo sector report of a considerable gap between formal and informal aspects of safety. Several maritime accident investigations point to this gap as an important contributory cause, indicating that risk increases when informal practices ignore or violate formal procedures. The main aims of this paper are therefore to examine the factors influencing procedure negligence in the coastal cargo sector, and to discuss how to reduce the gap between formal and informal aspects of safety. The study is based on quantitative survey results of 180 crewmembers and qualitative research interviews with 10 leading officers on cargo vessels sailing along the coast of Norway. Survey results indicate that procedure negligence is related to work pressure and demanding working conditions. It is also related to outcome measures like personal injuries and perceptions of risk and safety. A positive organizational safety culture is experienced by respondents reporting of less procedure negligence. Interview results indicate, for example, that formal procedures are ignored or violated because of issues like efficiency demands and low-quality procedures, and that procedures more often are followed when they are perceived as useful and timely. In this article, it is thus suggested that a positive safety culture includes an alignment of formal and informal aspects of safety, which requires time to comply with practical procedures. Interviewees suggest that appropriate procedures are: (1) developed by the users, (2) continuously improved, (3) simplified, and (4) supervised by local expertise instead of general experts.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Kristine Vedal Størkersen; Ross O. Phillips. Procedure Negligence in Coastal Cargo: What Can Be Done to Reduce the Gap between Formal and Informal Aspects of Safety? Safety 2018, 4, 34 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Kristine Vedal Størkersen, Ross O. Phillips. Procedure Negligence in Coastal Cargo: What Can Be Done to Reduce the Gap between Formal and Informal Aspects of Safety? Safety. 2018; 4 (3):34.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Kristine Vedal Størkersen; Ross O. Phillips. 2018. "Procedure Negligence in Coastal Cargo: What Can Be Done to Reduce the Gap between Formal and Informal Aspects of Safety?" Safety 4, no. 3: 34.
The European Union (EU) promotes a gradual lifting of restrictions on foreign hauliers involved in domestic road transport of goods (cabotage), and liberalization of the current road cabotage rules may further increase the proportion of foreign heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) on Norwegian roads. The aims of the present study are to: (1) Examine the safety outcomes of increasing internationalisation in (Norwegian) road transport of goods; and (2) Discuss the importance of potential risk factors related to increasing proportions of foreign HGVs on Norwegian roads. We use four data sources to shed light on the aims. Results show that foreign HGVs account for 6% of the average domestic transport in Norway, and 11% of the HGVs involved in personal injury accidents. Additionally, foreign HGVs have a three times higher risk of single vehicle accidents, and twice the risk of head-on collisions. Foreign HGV drivers also seem more likely to trigger fatal accidents. We conclude that two risk factors seem to be important: (1) experience with/competence on Norwegian roads and (2) winter driving. Thus, the safety challenge is not that the drivers are foreign, but that they to some extent lack experience with, and competence on, the Norwegian road networks and the challenges that these roads may pose (e.g., narrow roads with high gradients, many curves, snow and ice). Previous research from other countries has also found that lacking experience with national road networks is an important risk factor. Given our results on risk factors, we may hypothesize that if foreign HGV drivers get more experience and education on Norwegian driving conditions, then increased internationalization could perhaps be of less concern in road safety. When discussing the higher accident risk and lower experience of foreign HGV drivers in Norway, it is important to note that the reason for foreign HGV drivers, working for foreign hauliers, to drive in Norway is that there are customers of the goods in Norway. Interviewees stressed that the foreign driver is often the last link in a long and complex chain of actors involved in the transport. Although these actors have a legal responsibility to “contribute to safety,” interviewees stated that this responsibility is vague and not clearly enforced. We therefore suggest the clarification of, and an increase in, the responsibilities of the different parties involved in goods transport, especially the transport buyers. This means to both ensure the experience and training of the drivers (e.g., preparing them properly to drive on winter roads), and to positively influence their transport safety in other ways (e.g., reducing stress and time-pressure).
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Gunhild Meyer Levlin; Inger Beate Hovi. Internationalisation in Road Transport of Goods in Norway: Safety Outcomes, Risk Factors and Policy Implications. Safety 2017, 3, 22 .
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Ross O. Phillips, Gunhild Meyer Levlin, Inger Beate Hovi. Internationalisation in Road Transport of Goods in Norway: Safety Outcomes, Risk Factors and Policy Implications. Safety. 2017; 3 (4):22.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Ross O. Phillips; Gunhild Meyer Levlin; Inger Beate Hovi. 2017. "Internationalisation in Road Transport of Goods in Norway: Safety Outcomes, Risk Factors and Policy Implications." Safety 3, no. 4: 22.
Recent research suggests that the concept of safety culture, specified as traffic safety culture, may have great potential for improving traffic safety. However, as the safety culture concept has been traditionally applied to an organization and its members, the main aim of this paper is to examine how the concept can be applied to road traffic. This is largely a question of which analytical unit the traffic safety culture concept could be applied to. This paper examines three alternatives: (1) local communities, (2) nations, and (3) peer groups. These alternatives are evaluated against four criteria: (A) Is it well defined? (B) Can it be used to explain traffic safety behaviour? (C) Is it possible to influence? (D) Does it provide new insights into traffic safety problems? This paper concludes that while the local community alternative and national alternative appear too heterogeneous, the peer group alternative provides what seems to be a new and promising basis for targeted traffic safety interventions. The discussion indicates, however, issues that need to be examined in further research.
Tor-Olav Nævestad; Torkel Bjørnskau. How Can the Safety Culture Perspective be Applied to Road Traffic? Transport Reviews 2012, 32, 139 -154.
AMA StyleTor-Olav Nævestad, Torkel Bjørnskau. How Can the Safety Culture Perspective be Applied to Road Traffic? Transport Reviews. 2012; 32 (2):139-154.
Chicago/Turabian StyleTor-Olav Nævestad; Torkel Bjørnskau. 2012. "How Can the Safety Culture Perspective be Applied to Road Traffic?" Transport Reviews 32, no. 2: 139-154.