The tourism management literature has recently shown increasing interest in exploring the potential offered by the smart tourism destination initiative, conceived as the integrated use of ICT solutions for achieving greater efficiency and sustainability, enriching the tourist experience and boosting destination competitiveness. However, innovative technologies risk to be ineffective without adequate governance structures that are required to ensure the effective coordination and integration of tourism firms, government and communities in implementing a holistic smart-oriented development plan for destinations. This paper aims to integrate the recent smart approach with the destination governance theory to develop a governance process framework for smart tourism destinations. The framework explains how the smart approach can inform the planning and implementation of smart development goals, and specifically how smartness principles, tools and methods can be applied to increase the sustainable competitiveness of destinations beyond the mere technology dimension, making explicit the role of collaborative structures, user-driven services, social innovation and local community involvement. At the theoretical level, the paper offers an integrative perspective for designing and implementing effective smart tourism destination governance structures and processes. In practical terms, the framework can be viewed as a flexible tool in the hands of destination managers and policy makers: it shows how to match the design of governance structures and processes with the specific destination context and how to exploit “smart dimensions” for its development by relying on an incremental logic based on subsequent, interdependent stages.

Departing from the dominant approach focused on individual and meso-level determinants, this paper develops a macroeconomic formalization of job insecurity within a New Keynesian framework in which the standard IS-NKPC-Taylor rule block is augmented with labor-market frictions. The model features partially informed private agents who receive a noisy signal about economic fundamentals from a fully informed public sector. When monetary policy satisfies the Taylor principle, the equilibrium is unique and determinate. However, the release of news about current or future fundamentals can generate a "Paradox of Transparency" through general-equilibrium interactions between aggregate demand and monetary policy. When the Taylor principle is violated, belief-driven equilibria may emerge. Validation exercises based on the Simulated Method of Moments support the empirical plausibility of the model's key implications.

Despite the importance of this variable in the macroeconomic context, current research on job insecurity remains mainly confined to its non-systemic dimension. The research aim of this paper is to identify the short-run and long-run macroeconomic determinants of job insecurity in the presence of asymmetric information between public and private agents, informative shocks, and different degrees of institutional communication transparency. To accomplish this goal, a small-scale, rational expectations, New Keynesian model is proposed in which limitedly informed households and firms receive a potentially noisy informative signal about the unobservables from fully informed government and central bank. It is found that, notwithstanding the fulfillment of the Taylor principle, if public agents transfer all the available information to the private agents without communication ambiguities, the model admits a unique, stable equilibrium path along which the 'Paradox of Transparency' can emerge. Otherwise, the model's dynamics become unpredictable in terms of equilibrium existence and multiplicity, and job insecurity plays a potentially fundamental role in equilibrium determinacy. Appropriate policy recommendations are discussed.